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LETTER FROM THE DEPARTMENT CHAIR
In this, Res Publica's nineteenth issue, we encounter a fine collection of some of the best
work produced by our students this year. Sponsored by the IWU chapter of Pi Sigma Alpha,
the national political science honor society, this Res Publica showcases the incisive thinking
and very capable writing of students who each, in her or his own way, address various
intersections between attitude fonnation - or in some cases big ideas - and political practice.
Topics include the potential tension between the ideas of modem democracy and the ancient
ideas of Confucianism, the political salience of second-hand smoke, the impact of economic
conditions on violence in Northern Ireland, the dance between right-wing populist parties
and European voters, the efficacy of family value frames as ideological metaphors, and U.S.
Supreme Court justices' annual parry with one another and public opinion as they selectively
assert their institution's role as the dark horse in American politics. These are thoughtful,
challenging, and indeed delightful essays to read. This year's issue of Res PllbJica truly
deserves a broad audience, so we hope once you have read it you will share it with friends,
family members, and colleagues. We are quite proud of our students' accomplishments are
thrilled to share some of those with you here.
Each year the curriculum in the Department of Political Science greets new members of our
community with a series of introductory courses as they acclimate to college life. From there
students branch out to explore a wide variety of areas running along the major dimensions
of our discipline, from institutions and behavior, to American and international topics,
employing qualitative and quantitative tools. By their senior years, many of our students have
sampled broadly from this rich array of topics and experiences. As they undertake their
senior research seminars - the source of most of these essays - they apply what they have
learned. At their best, they produce the work you hold in your hands. The maturation of
their analytical skills is truly remarkable over four years, and we are excited about the
students' prospects as professionals and, importantly, as citizens. There is, of course, a
bittersweet quality to the impending graduation of most of these authors, though as we see
them go we dwell on the sweet, knowing they will talce with them into a complicated, inter
connected, competitive, and

(as

Patrick Cavanaugh reminds us) dangerous world the

knowledge, values, and skills they learned during their time at Illi nois Wesleyan. The faculty
members are grateful for their coming, and their going.
A particular thanks goes to Res Ptlblica's lead editors, Nick Desideri and Ryan Winter, ably
assisted by associate editors Lauren Burke and Patrick Cavanaugh. From start to finish Res

Publica is a student production. We are proud of them for what they have done here, ,
producing and sustaining what we believe to be one of the few undergraduate political
science journals in the nation for nin eteen years running. We also look forward to hearing
about their outrageously successful careers and lives in the years to come.

Thank you for reading.
Greg Shaw
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EDITORS' INTRODUCTION
Serving as editors for Res PZfblica XIX has been a fantastic experience. We were thrilled not
only with the high number of submissions this year but also the quality of them all. While we
were unable to accept every submission, each writer impressed us with their breadth of
knowledge on their chosen topic. Even more heartening were the submissions by
underclassmen. From gateway essays to senior seminar papers, we received a wide array of
material for edition of Res Publica, and we encourage everyone returning for another year at
Illinois Wesleyan University to submit again when the call for papers comes again.
This year's. edition is centered on the origin and subsequent spread of ideas. How does
newspaper coverage influence American attitudes on gun control? Are Confucianism and
democracy more compatible than some scholars have suggested? Why are some right-wing
parties more politically powerful than others? In what way is the Supreme Court still the
"Dark Horse" of American politics? These are the questions that cut below the surface of
our society and illuminate essential truths about how we construct the world around us.
As Res PlIblica approaches its second decade of publication, we look back on the
publication's impressive history. One of the few undergraduate political science journals in
the nation, Res Publica has offered the students of Illinois Wesleyan a place to exhibit their
writing and research for nineteen years. Over the years, Res Publica has helped students refine
their writing and display their abilities to the public, both of which represent invaluable
opportunities.
We greatly appreciate the contributions of our associate editors, Lauren Burke and Patrick
Cavanaugh, who took time out of their busy senior year schedules to provide assistance and
feedback. Without their hard work, this year's edition of Res Pllblica would not be in your
hands. We extend a similar sense of gratitude to the Department of Political Science faculty,
who have pushed us to improve our analytical, writing, and research skills. It has been a
privilege learning from and working with such inspiring individuals. Last, we would like to
thank Karl Winter for his outstanding cover artwork, which ties together the themes of this
year's articles and the overarching power of ideas.
Thank you for reading; we hope you enjoy this year's edition of Res Publica!
Nick Desideri and Ryan Winter
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RADICAL RIGHT POPULIST PARTIES IN BRITAIN AND THE NETHERLANDS:
EXPLAINING ELECTORAL SUCCESS
Casey Plach
Radical right-wmg populist parties have recently emerged throughout Europe, but the
electoral success among these parties is incredibly mconsistent. In the Netherlands, Geert Wilders'
Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV) has become established in the country's political system, while the
British National Party (BNP) and the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) struggle to gam
even a single seat in British parliament. Models outlining a formula for the rise and success of
populist parties can help explain why some parties achieve an electoral breaktiuough and others do
not. Researcher of radical right populism Pippa Norris' model of electoral success is divided mto a
political demand side that focuses on the public grievances driving these parties, and a political
supply side that focuses on mternal party activity as well as external factors shaping opportunity
structure. This essay compares Britain's two radical right populist parties, the BNP and the UKIP,
with the PVV in the Netherlands, and applies Norris' framework to explain the greater electoral
success of the PVV. It concludes that while Britain and Netherlands are similar in terms of political
demand, populist parties have seen more success in the Netherlands because supply-side factors are
more favorable.

Poptllist Parties in the U.K and the Netherlands
The British National Party was formed in

1982 by John Tyndall when he split from the

National Front, a far-right party for whites only. With its ideological roots in fascism, the BNP has
struggled to gain political legitimacy and respect. Current leader Nick Griffin has called for a
modernization of the party to change this. He denies the fascist label and instead identifies the party
as having "ideological foundations of a twenty-fIrst-century 'popular nationalism,"'j Following
Griffin's transformation, the BNP's platform defends "democracy, freedom, culture, and identity"2
Despite this reconstruction, key grievances remained the same, with immigration and European
Union membership at the forefront. However, the party's rhetoric has changed in an attempt to
appear less radical. For example, the BNP is extremely anti-immigrant, seeing immigrants as a threat
to British culture, and it uses nativist rhetoric in an attempt to legitimize these concerns. BNP
members defend their stance on the grounds that multiculturalism "wipes out indigenous cultures
and identities through homogenization" and so, by opposing it, they "[are] not racists but legitimate
defenders of ethnic and cultural diversity."3 The BNP is also very anti-European Union because it
sees the EU as a threat to democracy and national sovereignty. The party's target out-groups include

1 Copsey 2007, 75
2 "Democracy" 2010
3 Copsey 2007, 74
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political actors in the EU as well as immigrants within the state, especially Muslims. A vertical
structure of antagonisms is observed, as the party attacks both the "corrupt elites" at the top of
society and the "dangerous others" at the bottom. With these key issues driving the party, the BNP
garners support from "deprived and less well educated members of the working class [who] feel
under 'threat' from immigration."4
Eleven years after the BNP's emergence, Alan Sked founded the Anti-Federalist League,
which would later evolve into The United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) now led by Nigel
Farage. The Anti-Federalist league was a campaign against the Maastricht Treaty, so at its inception
the UKIP's platform solely promoted anti-EU sentiments. Realizing it could not last as a single-issue
party, the UKIP broadened its appeals. It currently identifies itself as a "democratic, libertarian party"
and focuses on leaving the EU and restoring democracy by empowering the people. Its manifesto
explains its anti-EU stance and continues, "But the EU is only the biggest symptom of the real
problem - the theft of our democracy by a powerful, remote political 'elite' which has forgotten that
it's here to serve the people.'" The UI<JP's enemies are the mainstream politicians in both Britain
and the ED. Immigration is also a concern, but the UKIP takes an economic perspective focusing on
limited jobs and welfare, unlike the BNP's cultural protectionist stance. The absence of overtly racist
rhetoric has helped the UI<IP be more successful and appear as a more respectable party than the
BNP. The party's basis of mobilization consists of Eurosceptic voters and ordinary, working-class
people, but it also attracts some dissatisfied Conservatives.
In

2002, almost a

decade after the UKIP was founded, the Netherlands saw the rise of the

Pim Fortuyn List (LPF), a radical right party populist that set the stage for the emergence of Geert
Wilder's Party for Freedom in

2006.

Pim Fortuyn founded the LPF in response to the "Purple

Coalition" coalition formed by three of the mainstream parties who, he felt, ignored the people. He
was killed just before the

2002 election, but the party gained 17 percent of

the vote and twenty-six

seats in Dutch Parliament.6 However, the LPF's success was short-lived. With the death of Fortuyn,
the party lost its organizational leadership and experienced internal conflict, ultimately leading to its
collapse. Just a few years later, Geert Wilders took over as the country's new populist leader. He
broke from the mainstream right People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) after
disagreeing with the parliament leader about Turkey obtaining EU membership and founded Geert
Wilders' Dutch Party for Freedom. His party focuses on the same issues as the BNP and UI<IP, with
the major concerns being EU membership, immigration, and restoring democracy. Target out-groups
are also similar, as the PVV is very hostile to political elites working for the EU and the mainstream

4 Goodwin2012, 20

5 "TheOnly"
6 Van Kessel 2011, 74

RES PUBLIe A �I

3

Dutch parties, as well as to Muslim immigrants. For Wilders, "Islam is perceived as a violent
'ideology' and Dutch culture should be protected against the process of Islamisation."7 Like the
BNP, he employs nativist rhetoric in an attempt to restore national sovereignty by means of bringing
ownership back to the "ttue and good people," also referred to as the heartland. The PVV mainly
draws support from Eurosceptic voters and so-called "losers of modernization," who have lost their
jobs to outsourcing, technological development, and other effects of globalization. They are
considered the "ordinary hardworking men and women"- a phrase that Wilders is never hesitant to
employ.8

Demalld
The demand side of Norris' model focuses on public grievances and how these grievances
drive the emergence of new political parties. Touching on the most prominent concerns among
countries in \Vestern Europe, Norris explains, "the rising salience of cultural protectionism, in a
backlash against globalization and population migration, has altered the public agenda in each
countty, providing sporadic openings for new parties.'" Public grievances increase electoral demand,
and the higher the electoral demand for PRR parties, the more likely they are to succeed.
Furthermore, if there is dissatisfaction among the public, voters are more likely to be receptive to
parties who address issues that mainstream parties have ignored or failed to solve. Dissatisfaction in
Britain and the Netherlands has stemmed from sttuctural changes both countries have experienced in
recent years. Both countries became member states of the European Union, were affected by the
economic crisis of 2008, are subject to negative effects of globalization, and have experienced an
increase in immigration. These changes produced electoral demand and led to the emergence of
populist parties.
To determine what grievances are present in Britain and the Netherlands, data from the
Eurobarometer Public Opinion Survey of

2012 can be examined. One question on the survey asks,

''What do you think are the two most important issues facing (OUR COUNTRY) at the moment?"
The three highest ranked issues in the United Kingdom were unemployment (40 percent), the
economic situation

(30

percent), and immigration (24 percent). In the Netherlands, they were the

economic situation (55 percent), health and social security (46 percent), and unemployment

(32

percent). Unemployment and the economic situation were concerns in both countries, which
demonstrates that on the macro level the public has similar grievances.
Populist radical right parties in Western Europe have found success capitalizing on issues of
democracy, globalization, and immigration, all of which are public concerns in the Netherlands and

7 Van Kessel2011, 75
8

Ibid., 84

, Norris2005, 4

41RES PUBLICA

the United I<:: ingdom. According to a May

2004 Eurobarometer survey, 27 percent of Dutch

respondents and 23 percent of British respondents indicated that they were not very satisfied with
the way democracy works in their country. Satisfaction rates were similar on all measures, which
indicates that both countries were experiencing similar gtievances. Populist parties were gaining
ground when this survey was taken, and with about a quarter of the public in each country expressing
dissatisfaction with their democratic process, the demand was present for a populist party to
respond.
In terms of globalization, results from the May
percent of Dutch respondents and

37

2012 Eurobarometer survey indicated that 24

percent of Btitish respondents believed globalization

represents a threat to employment and companies. This is another public concern, common in both
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom; One outcome of globalization is an increase in
immigration rates, which is an issue that has not escaped notice in Western Europe. Currently, the
foreign born population in Netherlands makes up

12.9

11.2 percent of the

total population, and in Britain

percent.to The public is wary of the immigrant population and high immigration rates, and

populist parties are acting on these concerns.
In both the United I<::ingdom and the Netherlands, public demand is present for a party that
offers simple solutions to restore democracy, protect the country from the negative effects of
globalization, and limit immigration. The opportunity exists in both countries for radical right
populist parties to respond and flnd success. Overall, the demand actually appears to be slightly
stronger in Britain. Immigration, a central focus for all three populist parties, ranks among the U.K.'s
top three concerns and 13 percent more of the British public views globalization as a threat.
However, demand is not a direct indicator of success. This is especially apparent in the 2010 general
election results. In Britain, the UKIP gained 3.2 percent of the vote, and the BNP gained 1.9 percent,
but neither won a seat in parliament." In the Netherlands'

15.5

2010

general election, the PVV gained

percent of the vote, which earned it twenty-four seats out of

150

in parliament.12 While both

countries are similar in terms of political demand, the PVV has clearly seen greater electoral success,
not only in seats gained but also in overall share of the vote. To explain this difference, political
supply-side factors must be considered.

StlPPfy (Extema�
Norris explains that demand alone is not enough to guarantee the success of populist parties.
She introduces a supply side, which "focus[es] upon patterns of party competition, including where
mainstream parties decide to place themselves ... as well as the actions taken by the radical right

10
11
12

OEeD 2013

Denyer 2010, 593
VanKessel2011, 74
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themselves."" External supply-side factors include electoral conditions, ideological space, availability
of the electorate, and the media. These factors are outside of party control, but in certain instances
they can contribute to the electoral success of populist parties.
A country's electoral conditions are critical in deciding how many seats a party will gain.
Although the BNP and the UKIP do not hold any seats in the British Parliament, they do have a
combined fourteen seats in the European Parliament. This difference has only one possible
explanation: the electoral system. In the United Kingdom, general elections use a first-past-the-post
(FPTP) system where the candidate who earns the most votes wins the seat. As Duverger's law
states, plurality rule voting tends to produce two-party systems, which "makes it rather difficult for
new political forces (populist or otherwise) to make an electoral breakthrough."!4 This type of system
can also discourage the electorate from voting for a third party candidate because their vote will most
likely not carry any significance. The BNP and UKIP received a combined 5.1 percent of the vote in
the last election, but "the FPTP electoral system continues to restrict their ability to impact on
national level politicS."15
Because the European Parliament uses a proportional representation system (FR), the BNP
and UKIP have experienced some electoral success at this level. In this system, candidates gain seats
in proportion to the number of votes they receive. The Netherlands also uses a PR system for its
general election, which in part explains the electoral success of the PVV. The system has no
established threshold, meaning that parties only need .67 percent of the popular vote to gain a seat."
The electoral conditions naturally encourage new parties to enter the political arena. In fact,
"[b]etween 1946 and 2003, 18 new parties have gained entry into parliament."!7 The PVV has
benefitted from this open and accessible system, while the BNP and UKIP are working under
conditions that impede electoral success.
Other actors in the political system also have an effect on a party's success. Mainstream
parties play a role because their position on the political spectrum and whether or not they respond
to the concerns of the public determines how much ideological space exists for a populist party to
emerge. In the United Kingdom, mainstream parties are much more in tune with public grievances.
They will respond to constituent concerns and often "shift policies to mop up temporary forms of
discontent."18 In fact, the Conservative party has even used populist rhetoric itself, "portray[ing] the

13

Norris2005, 14

14

Fella2008,182

15 Ibid., 197
" Lucardie2008,152
17

Ibid., 152

1 8 John

andMargetts2009,497
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New Labour as an out-of-touch liberal metropolitan elite selling out the British people."" This does
not bode well for populist parties who insist that all parts of the establishment are unresponsive to
the people. Rather than gaining the political legitimacy that they aim for, these parties are restricted to
the role of a pressure group on established parties. For example, the BNP and the UKIP both

� to the issue as well,

concentrate on immigration, but mainstream parties have responde

undermining their efforts. In fact, many might agree with Matthew Goodwin that the "Conservatives
have offered a more credible brand to citizens anxious over immigration."'o Established parties in the
U.K. present themselves as a more legitimate option and since they respond to public concerns, there
is very little ideological space for a populist party to succeed.
In contrast, mainstream parties in the Netherlands have converged ideologically and are
unresponsive to public concerns, opening political space where populist parties can thrive. With a
highly consociational political system in the Netherlands, these parties have not established distinct
platforms and have converged in such a way that voters cannot distinguish between them.21 The
Labour Party, for example, attempted to address multiculturalism and the public's concerns over
cultural preservation, but they gave up and "by 2003 . . little was separating the three mainstream
.

parties on this issue."22 This allowed for populist parties, such as the PVV, to step in and be the
answer voters were looking for. In addition, mainstream parties in the Netherlands are on the whole
less likely to respond to public grievances. Unlike mainstream parties in the U.K. that at least attempt
to deal with high immigration rates, "[e]stablished parties [in the Netherlands] failed to recognize that
citizens actually were concerned about the perceived problems of immigration."23 This provides the
perfect opportunity for the PVV to claim that the establishment is ignoring important issues and that
the people are not being heard.
Even if political parties are responsive to public grievances, the availability of the electorate
is an important factor in determining the support a populist party will obtain. With the UK's highly
structured patty system, voters are not very receptive to new parties like tlle BNP or UKIP.
Availability in large part depends on how tied voters are to their respective parties, and in the U.K.
mainstream parties have been relatively stable and remain legitimate choices. A State of the Nation
Poll measuring views on the BNP indicates that only 9 percent of self-identified Conservatives
"might vote for" the BNP in the future.24 There are some dissatisfied conservatives, but for the most
part voters are loyal to their respective parties and would not readily abandon them for a new one.

19 Fella2008, 197
20 Goodwin 2012, 17

21 VanKessel2011,78

22

Ibid,
. 79

21 Ibid.

24 John andMar getts2009, 507
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Meanwhile, the electorate in the Netherlands is highly receptive to new parties because of
structural changes the country experienced in the twentieth century. Before World War II, Dutch
society was organized according to different symbolic pillars, including a Protestant, Catholic, and
Socialist pillar. Schools, media, and political parties were divided according to these pillars, but this
system broke down and society experienced drastic changes, especially in the political system. Within
this pillarized structure "the electorate largely voted along the cleavage lines of religion and social
class .. " By the turn of the twenty-first century, however, the explanatory power of this factor had
become very 10w."25 Voters are no longer tied to the pillars that in the past had defined all their
choices, and today parties are still developing to respond to the new social structure. This upheaval
means that voters are "less loyal to traditional parties and ready to give the benefit of the doubt to
new parties."" The PVV is one new party trying to establish itself in this new political structure and
with such a highly receptive electorate, it has been able to experience success.
Another factor that can help or hurt a party in its attempts to find electoral success is the
media. In Britain, the media is very critical of the UKIP and the BNP. In her study on populist
parties and their relation to the popular media, Tjitske Akkerman notes:
One of the reasons that the BNP is less successful is that it faces a less favorable discursive
oppottunity structure. In contrast to the PVV, a party that is treated by Dutch political
parties and the media as a normal parry, the BNP has been generally stigmatized by leading
politicians and the media as a racist or fascist patty.27
The BNP's platform is controversial, and its attempts to legitimize itself are stunted by the media.
While less radical than the BNP, the UKIP also faces trouble in establishing legitimacy. It directs its
efforts in distancing itself from the BNP, but is still viewed by the media and by many voters as
radical.
As Akkerman points out, the PVV is considered normal and established in the Netherlands,
even though it employs much of the same rhetoric as the BNP and the UKIP. The party is highly
institutionalized and has enough support to be considered a normal part of the political system,
which is why the media is less critical. After pillarization, parties were no longer supported by mass
media, and for the most part the media has attempted to remain neutral. Therefore, the party's "core
consists of a leader and a parliamentary group that is very effectively fenced off for outsiders in
general and journalists in particular."28 Geert Wilders is the only formal member of the PVV, so it is
not a very open organization. Without the media working against it, the PVV has an easier time
developing a positive reputation.
25 VanKessel2011, 77

26 Lucar die2008, 155
27 Akkerman2009, 935
28

Akker man2009, 935
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Although many factors work outside of party control, there are supply-side factors that allow
parties to direct their own success. Further criticizing the one-sided model that only focuses on
demand, Norris explains, "demand-side analysis is too simple and instead we need to give far greater
emphasis to what parties can do through thelr own actions as strategic agents."29 Here she is referring
to the internal supply-side factors, which include leadership and party organization. Parries have
control over these factors, so it is their responsibility to craft favorable conditions and create their
own political success.
Populist parties regard the public as a homogenous body, so a charismatic leader who
embodies the people plays a central role in a party's development and success. In Britain, the BNP
has struggled with leadership and building party reputation. John Tyndall, the original leader of the
BNP, embraced the fascist label and took extreme stances on many issues, believing that "all that was
required [in the quest for political power] was undiluted racism combined with strong and disciplined
central leadership."30 Not only did Tyndall fail to deliver electoral success, he tainted the image of the
BNP, which made restoring political respectability a central concern for Griffin when he took over.
Griffin directed his energy into modernizing the party and continually rejecting the extreme label the
BNP gained under Tyndall. However, the public remains skeptical because of the image Tyndall
promoted in the past. His leadership harmed the BNP, which is so "delegitimized by association with
fascism and violence" that it "has no hope of becoming a serious national force."31
In contrast, strong leadership has been consistent among radical right populist parties in the
Netherlands. Before Geert Wilders, the current leader of the PVV, Pim Fortuyn was the country's
central populist leader. He was charismatic and took a less extreme stance on many issues, causing
"the stigma of 'extreme right' . . . [to be] broken for good."" When Wilders took center stage, the
public was responsive because Fortuyn previously established a respectable image. However, in
comparison to Fortuyn, Wilders is "more radical in regards to immigration and integration" and "he
criticizes the establishment more harshly."33 Because Fortuyn did not taint the party's image like
Tyndall did with the BNP, Wilders does not meet resistance for his more extreme positions. Success
is, in part, dependent upon the leader and past leaders who worked to shape the party. The PVV has
this advantage, which contributes to its electoral success.
Party organization also impacts electoral success, and is critical for a party that wishes to
institutionalize and compete with mainstream parties. In the United Kingdom, "[b]oth the BNP and

29 Norris2005, 14
30 Copsey 2007, 66
31 Eatwell1998, 153
32 Mudde2007, 211
33 Van Kessel2011, 75

RES PUBLICA f9
UKIP have experienced infighting and continual organizational problems which jeopardize their
electoral chances."34 Over time, they have made improvements in basic party operations, such as
Internet development and recruitment efforts. However, the biggest challenge that remains is for the
radical right to become a united force. After various leadership disputes, both the BNP and UKIP
have become more stable and internally united, but they still compete against each other for votes,
which takes away from the success the radical right can achieve as a whole.
The PVV, on the other hand, is united and well-organized, which has allowed it to more
easily become an established party in the Dutch political system. Party operations are directed by
Wilders, who "managed to build up a united party organization under his own firm leadership while
sending out an appealing message to a large share of Dutch voters."35 The PVV may be running
smoothly now, but since Wilders is its only formal member the party's future may be at risk. The
LPF completely fell apart after Fortuyn's death because, like Wilders, he was the core of his party and
made all the decisions. To maintain efficient party operations, Wilders may allocate some of his
control or, in his absence, the PVV would likely face the same fate as the LPF.

Conclusion
As Norris explains, "the key to radical right success depends upon the complex interaction
of public demand and party supply under conditions of imperfect competition in a regulated electoral
marketplace."36 Success cannot be explained by supply or demand alone, but in the cases of Britain
and the Netherlands where demand is quite similar, differences in supply-side factors can be
examined to determine why populist parties are more likely to succeed in the Netherlands. In terms
of demand, the PVV, BNP, and UK1P all focus on the same ideals in an attempt to respond to
public grievances stemming from immigration, the EU, globalization, and a perceived loss of
democracy. These grievances drive the emergence of populist parties, and '\vill continue to cultivate
opportunity for the extreme right."37 However, to explain the success of these parties, both internal
and external supply side factors need to be examined.
In the Netherlands, supply factors created a favorable opportunity structure for Geert
Wilders' Dutch Party for Freedom to emerge and experience electoral success. With an open
electoral system, consensus-oriented politics, and depillarizarion of Dutch society, the Netherlands
was ready and available for a party like the PVV." Internal factors also play a role: the PVV is a well
organized party with strong leadership. Supply-side factors in Britain are quite the opposite, and have
gready harmed populist parties' chances at success. In Britain, the FPTP system is the root of many

34 John an dMargetts2009, 501
35 Van Kessel2011, 85
36 Norris2005, 4
37 Goodwin2012, 28
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electoral struggles the BNP and the UKIP face. It not only makes winning seats difficult, but also
leads to an extremely structured party system, in which outside parties cannot compete. These parties
may have answers to electorate concerns, but that does not mean the electorate is available and
willing to vote for them. Lack of organization and leadership also hindered the success of the BNP
and UKIP. Parties have control over these internal supply-side factors, but even if they can work
them in their favor, factors outside of party control will still be present, preventing populist parties in
Britain from experiencing electoral success on par with their Dutch counterparts.
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VICIOUS CYCLE OR BUSINESS CYCLE?: EXPLAINING POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN
NORTHERN IRELAND AFTER THE TROUBLES

Lauren Burke

Abstract: Tbere aI. CIImntIY tivo

sebools oftbollgbt tbat seek to explain tbe persistence ofpolitical violence in
Nortbe", Irelant/, one Ivitb a sociopoliticalfoclls and tbe other Ivith an economicfoclls. Expanding on past economic
tbeary, this paper lItilizes several mllitiple ,.gmsion models to test tbe applicability ofthe economic school's reialive
deprivation theory in thefifteenyears since the Trolfbles Ivereforo/allY ettded Ivith tbe signing ofthe Good Friday
Agreement. Tbe basis ofthis theory is that as economic conditions Ivorsen in a given area, the llumber rfacts 0/
political violettc e shollld also increase. This stutjy specificallY looked at the efficts ofa lising II11"'pIOYlllet1t rate and its
relationship to political violmce. !l7bile 110 slfcb "lationship could be obsemet/, there IVas a statisticallY significant
relationship betlvml Gross DOlllestic HOllsebold II/conle and the nllmber ofacts ofpolitical violence, Ivhieb SIlPPOlts
"Iative deprivation theory. These findings ilIpIY that policymakers Iii Northem II.land should foclls their ejfiJlts not on
reducing the IlIlemplq;lJlle1lt rate bill ratber 011 increasiNg the average level cifincome.
INTRODUCTION
From 1969 to 1998, the ethnonationalist conflict in Northern Ireland called the Troubles
was "easily the most intense violent conflict in Europe."39 More than three thousand people lost
their lives and approximately three percent of the population sustained some form of physical
injury.4o Although the level of politically motivated violence has subsided considerably since the
signing of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998, it continues on a smaller scale to this day.
Building on past research on the connection between economic conditions and political
violence, the goal of this study was to determine whether or not the unemployment rate had an effect
on political violence in Northern Ireland in the fifteen-year period following the Good Friday
Agreement. Conventional wisdom seems to be that a reduction in the unemployment rate will lead
to a decrease in the level of political violence, and several prominent scholars and policymakers hold
this belief. In the wake of the Unionist protests that began last December in Belfast, determining
whether or not this perceived connection is supported by statistical evidence would allow the
government to pursue policies that hinder the growth of hostile movements.
This study utilized several multiple regression models controlling for various economic and
political factors in order to isolate the effects of the unemployment rate on political violence and
thereby test the hypothesis that as the unemployment rate increases, the number of politically
motivated acts of violence will also increase. None of the various regression models found a
significant correlation between the unemployment rate and the number of politically motivated acts
of violence in Northern Ireland. However, political violence did show a significant correlation with
one control variable: annual Gross Disposable Household Income (GDHI). This fInding suggests
that although unemployment is not a significant predictor of political violence, other factors
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impacting the economic health of the country do make a difference. The correlation between GDHI
and violence also lends support to the relative deprivation theory and suggests that further study of
the impact of other economic variables on political violence would be a worthwhile investment, both
for policymakers in the U.K. and for economic and political theorists in other post-industrialized
conflict areas.
ROOTS OF VIOLENCE: LANDLORDS, FENIANISM, AND THE BORDER QUESTION
Today, Northern Ireland is fairly evenly divided between the primarily Catholic Nationalists
and the primarily Protestant Loyalists. The term Nationalist has been used interchangeably with the
term Republican due to this group's desire to incorporate the six Northern Irish counties into the
current Republic of Ireland, thereby uniting the entire island of Ireland to form a thirty-two-county
Republic. On the other side of the conflict are the Loyalists, often called Unionists because they
wish to remain a part of the United Kingdom and are vehemently against the proposed change.
These mutually exclusive goals are deeply rooted in the groups' cultural, religious, and political
histories.
The Catholic minority in Northern Ireland, typically of native Irish descent, was for centuries
at a relative disadvantage compared to the Protestant majority, who often trace their ancestry back to
the British settlers who colonized the island. As the Tudors, and subsequently Oliver Cromwell,
attempted to impose the new Anglican Church upon their unwilling Irish subjects, they confiscated
land from Irish Catholics and reallocated it to loyal British Protestants.4! These new landlords
established large plantations and enforced discriminatory policies that barred Catholics from
participating in Parliament.42 The Great Potato Famine from 1845 to 1849 exacerbated tensions
between Catholic peasants and the mostly Protestant landlords:' who developed a reputation for
evicting or otherwise mistreating their starving tenants." The famine's legacy along with continued
denial of political power to Catholics made many view Great Britain as an unwelcome, imperialist
power. It was this perception that gave rise to Fenianism: the revolutionary, nationalist movement
aimed at achieving Irish independence.
More moderate, nonviolent political actors attempted to achieve autonomy by pushing for
Home Rule, a policy that would have allowed Ireland to have its own Parliament separate from
Westminster.45 The movement met its fiercest opposition in the heavily Protestant Ulster province,
which includes the six counties that today constitute Northern Ireland. It was out of this opposition
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that the Unionist movement was born. 46 At the conclusion of the Anglo-Irish War, the six counties
of Northern Ireland were the only ones that established a Home Rule government; the rest of the
island was granted Free State status and, ultimately, independence.47
By intentionally partitioning Ireland in a manner that guaranteed a Protestant majority, the
British created conditions that generated conflict. While the new Irish Free State was overwhelmingly
Catholic and therefore protected the Catholics' rights, the Protestant majority in the North ensured
that the interests of the Catholic population were never sufficiently addressed and that systematic
discrimination against them continued.48 Unionists not only dominated the police force, the civil
service, and local government, but they also enjoyed job and housing options that were denied to
Catholics. This imbalance persisted until the 1960s, when Catholics inspired by the American Civil
Rights Movement attempted to draw attention to their struggles through participation in peaceful
protests. These protests evoked strong Unionist backlash and, to prevent violence, the government
banned all political demonstrations in an effort to prevent rioting. On October

5,

1968, Irish

Catholics defied one such ban in the city of Derry and were met with a violent response from the
Unionist-dominated Royal Ulster Constabulary.4' This highly publicized incident is considered by
many to be the starting date of what have been euphemistically termed the Troubles. For the next
thirty years, Loyalist and Republican paramilitaries engaged in a "Dirty War" that claimed the lives of
more than three thousand people, most of them civilians. 50 Fighting between the major paramilitary
organizations was officially ended by the Good Friday Agreement of 1998, although radical splinter
groups continue to commit acts of political violence to this day. The focus of this study will be
determining which factors are driving the violent actions of these new organizations.
EXPLANATIONS FOR THE USE OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE

The Sociopolitical Explanation
Social science explanations for political violence in Northern Ireland fall into two main
schools of thought: the sociopolitical explanation and the economic explanation. The sociopolitical
explanation contends that political violence in Northern Ireland occurs because the two major
ethnonationalist groups in the region continue to view their interests as mutually exclusive. Although
they constitute a majority in Northern Ireland, the Unionists are in fact a minority on the island of
Ireland as a whole. According to incorporation theory,51 also known as the "see-sa\v" theory,52 each
group's minority status makes it feel insecure. As a result, each group tends to view the political

46 Feeney, "A Deepening Crisis"
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advancement of the other as a threat to its own security and tries to assert its own power by
responding violendy to the enemy's political victories. Exposure to political violence leads to an
acceptance of violence ,vithin these communities, perpetuating a cycle of attacks and retributive
action that some expect to continue indefInitely.53 In essence, proponents of this view believe that
the only way to forge a lasting peace is by maintaining that peace for long enough that it becomes the
new norm.

The Ecollomic Explallatioll
The economic explanation seeks to refIne this belief in a never-ending cycle of violence and
argues that spikes in the level of paramilitary activity are correlated with economic conditions. One
of the most studied factors by proponents of this theory has been the unemployment rate. Northern
Ireland has suffered from relatively high unemployment compared to the rest of the United
Kingdom,54 and it is widely believed by both scholars and policymakers that unemployment is an
underlying cause of political violence.55 Proponents of this theory argue that the unemployed have a
tendency to blame society for their hardships and-more disturbingly-to express greater support
for "violent change" to the political system.56 However, others have found negative correlations
between unemployment rate and violence,57 attributed to the increased political apathy of the
unemployed58 or the increasing scarcity of resources available to terrorist organizations.59
The most relevant economic theories to the Northern Itish case are the relative deptivation
theory and the power-conflict variant of deprivation theory. Relative deptivation theory states that if
there is a "gap between expected and achieved welfare" for a population, they are likely to express
their frustration violendy.'O In the context of the Troubles, this theory would imply that the high
unemployment rate for all citizens led to an "equality of misery"61 that exacerbated the underlying
sociopolitical conflict and led to the Troubles.
Although results of studies working under this assumption failed to find any positive
correlation between the unemployment rate and violence,62 some scholars have argued that this
occurred because economic hardships were not equally distributed." In the 1970s, census data
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showed that the unemployment rate for Catholics was more than twice the rate for Protestants.64
Because the Catholics were economically worse off than the Protestant majority during the Troubles,
their comparative disadvantage may have driven them to participate in violent Republican
movements. This hypothesis reflects the "power-conflict" variant of deprivation theory,65 which
states that a group's absolute economic status is a less significant predictor of its likelihood to
respond violently than its economic status relative to other segments of the population. Empirical
studies of fluctuations in the unemployment rate during the Troubles found that higher
unemployment was positively correlated with acts of Republican paramilitary violence but not with
Loyalist violence," and although separate unemployment data for Catholics and Protestants is
unavailable, when these values are estimated, high Catholic unemployment was correlated with
increased Republican violenceP
Since the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, the socioeconomic gap between Catholics and
Protestants has narrowed considerably.68 Data from the 2011 Census show a 3 percent gap in the
unemployment rate of Protestants and Catholics,6'J suggesting that the anti-discrimination measures
of the Good Friday Agreement have in fact improved the employment prospects of members of the
Catholic community. The fact that political violence persists in Northern Ireland despite the
decreasing gap in the unemployment rates of these groups suggests that while the power-conflict
variant of deprivation theory might have explained political violence during the Troubles, it does not
explain the persistence of violence in the post-Good Friday Agreement period. If a correlation
between unemployment and violence persists as expected, this would suggest that the relative
deprivation theory, with its focus on the overall unemployment rate rather than on the unequal
treatment of Catholics and Protestants, would be applicable to this case. More broadly, this would
suggest that cohorts with an "equality of misery" are likely to engage in political violence.
EXPLAINING VIOLENCE AFTER THE GOOD FRIDAY AGREEMENT
While there is undoubtedly merit to the claim that acts of sectarian violence generate more
violence in response, the sociopolitical theory fails to address the immediate conditions that will be
most likely to ignite violent action and, consequently, leaves policymakers with few opportunities to
respond to the problem. In contrast, relative deprivation theory suggests that sectarian violence
occurs not because the groups are too different to peacefully coexist but rather because they are
experiencing a common problem. If high unemployment is truly the underlying cause of civil unrest,
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then policymakers have a greater capacity to handle the problem or at the very least to pursue
policies that may help them do so.
The United Kingdom has been investing in projects to improve the economy of Northern
Ireland for years, believing that a reduction in unemployment would lead to a reduction in political
violence throughout the country.70 The focus of this research will be determining the extent to
which the unemployment rate has affected political violence in the fifteen years following the
Troubles. If a strong relationship between the variables can be determined, then the continuing
support for economic initiatives as political violence deterrents can be more readily justified. Based
on the narrowing unemployment gap between the ethnonationalist groups and the assumptions of
the relative deprivation theory, the following hypothesis was proposed: As the unemployment rate
increases, the number of politically motivated acts of violence will also increase.
RESEARCH DESIGN
In order to test this hypothesis, the present study utilized multiple regression models to
analyze statistics collected by the Northern Irish government. Quarterly unemployment data from
the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Investment of Northern Ireland was used to measure the
main independent variable, the unemployment rate. Because it is widely acknowledged that
participants in political violence tend to be young and male,7! separate regression equations were run
controlling for age and gender in order to determine whether or not unemployment for those
particular groups had an effect on the level of political violence. In order to rule out potential
intervening variables, the model also controlled for both Regional GDHI and political attitudes over
time. The measurement of political attitudes utilized three categories: Unionist, Nationalist, and
Other, Neither, or Don't Know, 72
The dependent variable, political violence, was measured using data collected by the Police
Service of Northern Ireland (pSNI). Specifically, this study utilized statistics taken from the PSNI
Security Situation report. I combined the total number of violent incidents per quarter in four
different categories of violent action into an aggregate total to get a clearer picture of how the level of
political violence varied over the fifteen-year period covered by the study. The categories included in
the aggregate measure are as follows: paramilitary style shootings, paramilitary style assaults, bombing
incidents related to the Security Situation, and shooting incidents related to the Security Situation. In
the time period included in this study, there were a total of 6,328 incidents. The use of this relatively
narrow definition of Security Situation-related violence rather than a broader study of sectarian crime
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allowed me to ensure that the incidents studied had an underl)�ng political motivation and were not
purely acts of ethnic hatred.
DATA AND ANALYSIS
My results have led me to reject my hypothesis that the unemployment rate has an effect on
political violence in Northern Ireland. For every category that I analyzed-regardless of time lag,
age group, or gender controls-the unemployment rate did not have a significant relationship with
the level of political violence in Northern Ireland in the post-Good Friday Agreement period. The
consistency of these fmdings strongly refutes the possibility of a causal relationship between my
independent and dependent variables.
It is worth noting that the unemployment rate might not completely capture the
employment situation in Northern Ireland. The unemployment rate is a percentage equal to the
number of unemployed individuals divided by the number of workers participating in the labor
force. The labor force is the sum of employed and unemployed workers, not the total working-age
population. Therefore, the unemployment rate excludes so-called "discouraged workers"
individuals who have been unemployed for so long that they are no longer searching for work and
have dropped out of the labor force. It may well be that the long-term unemployed and
discouraged workers are more likely to have politically-motivated grievances and to act more
violently than those individuals who are included in the total unemployment rate. This is a
possibility that should be taken into account in future research on this matter.
Despite the absence of a relationship between political violence and the unemployment rate,
the relative deprivation theory still appears to hold true for the period under study. Another
economic indicator-Gross Domestic Household Income-showed a significant negative
correlation with political violence in each of the six models considered.73 The U.K. Office for
National Statistics defined the GDHI as "the amount of money left available \vithin the household
sector for spending or saving, after expenditure associated with income, for example, taxes and
social contributions, property ownership and provision for future pension income. It is calculated
gross of any deductions for capital consumption." The regression models used in this study
showed that as the total GDHI increases by £1 billion, the total number of Security Situation
related incidents decreased by between twenty-four and twenty-nine incidents, depending on the
other variables used in the model. Each of these correlations was statistically significant at the
0.001 level, indicating that there is an extremely small likelihood that the relationship occurred by
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chance. While unemployment itself does not appear to influence the level of violence, income and
other economic factors almost certainly make a contribution.
Shifts in political beliefs also appear to be influencing the level of political violence in
Northern Ireland. In Model 3, which utilized a one-quarter unemployment rate lag, the results
indicated that a one percentage point increase in the number of people reporting a Unionist political
affiliation led to roughly nine fewer Security Situation incidents. Model 4 indicates an eight incident
increase for every one percentage point increase in the proportion of respondents identifying as
Nationalists and a fourteen incident increase for every one percentage point increase in the
proportion of those not affiliating with either party. The other models showed similar patterns.
These results are inconsistent with the idea that the political divide between Unionists and
Republicans is the cause of violence and the data show that an increase in nonaffiliated individuals
is a contributing factor.
While the increase in violence corresponding with an increase in the percentage of
respondents identifying as Republican-the group that has historically been involved in rebellious
activities-seems to make logical sense, the fact that an increase in Unionist affiliation leads to a
decrease in paramilitary violence is somewhat puzzling. It might be posited that Unionists are less
likely in the post-Good Friday Agreement period to participate in paramilitary acts of violence than
are Republicans, but the raw data refute this claim. Since 1998, Loyalists have been responsible for
685

of the 1,181 paramilitary style shootings reported in Northern Ireland through the final quarter

of 2012, compared to the 496 such shootings carried out by Republicans. With respect to
Paramilitary Style assaults, Loyalists were behind 948 of the
were responsible for
in the future.

464.

1,412

incidents, whereas Republicans

The cause of these discrepancies is a subject that deserves further study
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Regression Modell: Percent Unionist

M odI
e Summary
Model

R

R Sguare

Adjusted R
Square

Std. Error of
the Estimate

1

.698

.487

.443

55.82

Coefficients

(Constant)
Unemployment Rate All Persons
Total GDHI (£ Billions)
Political Beliefs Percent Other/
Neither/Don't Know
Political Beliefs: Percent Unionist

Unstandardized Coefficients
B
Std. Error
t

Sig.

808.57

250.04

3.23

.002

-10.40

8.66

-1.20

.236

-25.75***

6.84

-3.76

.000

5.06

5.22

.97

.337

-8.79**

4.09

-2.15

.037

Regression Model 2: Percent Nationalist

M0d eI
1

Summary

Model

R

R Sguare

Adjusted R
Sguare

Std. Error of
the Estimate

2

.688

.473

.428

56.57

Coefficients

(Constant)
Unemployment Rate All Persons
Total GDHI (£ Billions)
Political Beliefs Percent Other/
Neither/Don't Know
Percent Nationalist

Unstandardized Coefficients
t
B
Std. Error

Sig.

-43.19

227.18

-.19

.850

-9.53

8.81

-1.08

.285

6.85

-3.58

.001

12.84*

6.71

1.91

.062

7.99*

4.42

1.81

.077

-24.51***
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Regression Model 3: Percent Unionist, Lagged One Quarter Unemployment Rate

ModeI Summary
Model

R

R Square

Adjusted R
Square

Std. Error of
the Estimate

3

.710

.504

.461

55.45

Coefficients
Unstandarclized Coefficients
B
Std. Error
(Constant)
Lagged lQ Unemployment Rate
All Persons
Total GDHI (£ Billions)
Political Beliefs Percent Other/
Neither/Don't Know
Percent Unionist

t

Sig.

836.11

254.24

3.29

.002

-12.27

9.47

-1.30

.202

-27.77***

7.13

-3.90

.000

5.74

5.19

1.10

.275

-8.86**

4.05

-2.19

.034

Regression Model 4: Percent Nationalist, Lagged One Quarter Unemployment Rate

e Summary
Mo dI
Model

R

R Square

Adjusted R
Square

Std. Error of
the Estimate

4

.699

.489

.445

56.29

Coefficients

(Constant)
Lagged 1Q Unemployment Rate
All Persons
Total GDHI (£ Billions)
Political Beliefs Percent Other/
Neither/Don't Know
Percent Nationalist

Unstandardized Coefficients
Std. Error
B
t

Sig.

-21.38

223.83

-.10

.924

-11.56

9.71

-1.19

.240

-26.50***

7.17

-3.70

.001

13.59**

6.69

2.03

.048

8.02*

4.42

1.81

.076

22

I RES PUB LIe A

Regression ModelS: Percent Unionist, Lagged One Year Unemployment Rate

ModiS
e ummary
Model
5

R

R Square

Adjusted R
Square

Std. Error of
the Estimate

.737

.543

.501

54.48

Coefficients

(Constant)
Lagged lYear Unemployment
Rate All Persons
Total GDHI (j, Billions)
Political Beliefs Percent Other/
Neither/Don't Know
Percent Unionist

Unstandardized Coefficients
B
t
Std. Error

Sig.

739.58

236.12

3.13

.003

-6.34

10.19

-.62

.536

-28.50***

7.09

-4.02

.000

6.04

5.03

1.20

.236

-6.98*

3.72

-1.88

.067

Regression Model 6: Percent Nationalist, Lagged One Year Unemployment Rate

ModiS
e ummary
Model

R

R Square

Adjusted R
Square

Std. Error of
the Estimate

6

.725

.526

.481

55.53

Coefficients
Unstandardized Coefficients
B
T
Std. Error
(Constant)
Lagged lYear Unemployment
Rate All Persons
Total GDHI (j, Billions)
Political Beliefs Percent Other/
Neither/Don't Know
Percent Nationalist

Sig.

111.40

229.98

.48

.631

-6.77

10.40

-.65

.519

-27.53***

7.19

-3.83

.000

11.69*

5.82

2.01

.051

5.43

4.06

1.34

.187
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The results of this study have important implications for policymakers not only on the
island of Ireland but also in other areas of intense ethnic conflict. The statistical insignificance of
the unemployment rate on political violence may suggest that if the u.K. and Irish governments'
priority is the reduction of violent activity, policies aimed at increasing household income would be
more effective than efforts that specifically target lowering the unemployment rate. However, if
further research indicates that persistent structural unemployment is related to political violence, this
finding would strengthen the argument for government initiatives aimed at educating and training
prospective workers. According to T.D. Joe McHugh, Chairman of the Joint Commitree on the
Implementation of the Good Friday Agreement, current economic approaches to decreasing
violence focus on funding grassroots programs combating youth unemployment. He stated in a
press release this past September, "We are acutely aware that education and employment
opportunities often elude many young people in Northern Ireland and the border region. As such, a
focus on funding to assist in informal and formal education is to be welcomed."74 While the data
fail to show any causal relationship between the unemployment rate and political violence,
policymakers continue to act under the assumption that the two are related. Although a reduction in
unemployment benefits society as a whole and is a worthwhile policy initiative, if both governments
intend to reduce political violence, it would appear that an alternative approach would be more
effective.
One alternative would be shifting the focus to policies promoting the growth of individuals'
household incomes. The strong negative correlation between GDHI and political violence provides
empirical evidence for the link between economic wellbeing and the level of political violence. This
in turn suggests that policies stressing economic development, particularly for communities, have
the potential to lower the rates of violence. Policymakers could use this evidence as justification for
their economic growth initiatives, which currently receive immense amounts of funding both from
the U.K. and the EU.
Notable among these initiatives is the EU Programme for Peace and Reconciliation in
Northern Ireland and the Border Region of Ireland (the PEACE Programme). In the proposed
2020 EU budget, €150 million was set aside to continue the PEACE Programme in addition to the
€50 million already earmarked by the U.K." According to EU Commissioner for Regional Policy
Johannes Hahn, the success of the PEACE Programme has already drawn the attention of Russia,
Palestine, the Balkans, Colombia, and South Korea, countries that are seeking effective

74
75

Oireachtas 2013
Oireachtas 2013

24 I RES PUB Lie A

reconciliation models.76 The evidence presented in this study suggests that such emulation has the
potential to be highly effective in reducing politically motivated violence. This is a possibility that
international economic organizations should consider when determining how to allocate
development funds.
As Northern Ireland continues to come to terms \vith its troubled past, preventing the
resurgence of ethnic violence will continue to be of the utmost importance. In light of the empirical
evidence of this study, there can be little doubt that the establishment of a solid economic
foundation is critical to the maintenance of peace not only in this region but in other conflict areas
as well. The need for the government to continue monitoring and promoting this stability should
not be underestimated. Though Northern Ireland has undoubtedly made iucredible progress in the
past fifteen years, the continued presence of paramilitary actors cautions agaiust the possibility of
complacency on this matter.

76

"Northern Ireland: The Peace Programme" 2013
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MASS SHOOTINGS, MASS MEDIA, AND MASS OPINION: AN EXAMINATION OF
HOW THE NEWS MEDIA AFFECTS PUBLIC OPINION IN THE AFTERMATH OF
MASS SHOOTINGS
Patrick Cavanaugh

Abstract: This research looks at hom JJe)1Jspaper 1Jlmtiofls oj1Jlass shootitlgs correlate Ivith the percmtage ojpeople ill
tbe U.S. wbo vielv gUtl cOlltrol as the most jnportallt issllcfacillg the C01lntry. While tbe agmda-setting iffoct oj the nellJs
1Jledia bas bem tbeOtized and den/o11stratedfor a tllllllber

oj differellt iSSlles, scbolars bave yet to c011sider bOlv tbe fUlJVS
ojgUtl control tbrougb its coverage oj nlass sbootings.

media 1JlCfY set tbe agmdafor tbe pllblic's vie}]! 011 the i1Jlportance

Utilii/1fg designs putflrtb 0 Smidt (2011), Tal1 and Weaver (2007), and Winter and Eyal (1984), tbis paper
seeks tofill tbat gap 0 showillg tbe il/portance ojllCJVS 1Jledia disco/me sUlTOlmdittg 1Jlass ShOOtiltgS 011 public opinion
formation. Wbile the results do 110t Sh01V a dqillite causal pattern betJveen higher I1eJVS media mentions oja 1Jlass
sbOOtiltg and a bigber percentage

oj people Jvbo

tbiNk gUl1 control is inportall� tbis stucfy does delJ/onstrate that there is

an inportant relationship betJveel1 tlelVS 1Jledia disco/me and public opil1ion.
INTRODUCTION
A poll conducted by the Pew Research Center following the Newtown Shootings in December
found that public support for gun control increased in reaction to the tragedy. In the poll,

65

2012

percent

of respondents said that allowing citizens to own assault weapons makes the country more
dangerous,

56 percent approved of legislation to ban bullets that could explode through bulletproof

vests, and S3 percent supported measures to limit high-capacity ammunition clips.77 However,
another article published by Pew Research Center in J uly of 2013 found that by May 2013 the spike

in public suppOrt for gun control had receded to pre-Newton levels.78 This shift raises questions as
to how much the mass shooting actually impacted public opinion, and how much outside sources
influence that opinion. A possible source of influence is the news media, which has been theorized to
have an agenda-setting effect on public opinion ever since Walter Lipmann's influential Public
Opinion was published in

1922.

In recent years, the gun control debate has often been framed by mass shootings. \X1hen

a

mass shooting gains traction in the media, the gun control debate is reignited, and politicians and
special interest groups on both sides voice opinions on the appropriate course of action. Mass
shootings appear to be followed by heated discourse on the extent to which gun control laws should
be changed in response to the shooting. It would seem that mass shootings, defined by the FBI as
public active shooter incidents wherein four or more people are killed within a short time span,79
could bring gun control to the forefront of the public consciousness.
However, an empirical study on whether coverage of mass shootings has any effect on the
public's perception of the issue of gun control has yet to be done. Coverage of mass shootings has

77
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79

FBlgov 2005

28 I RE S PUB LIe A

been shown to impact perceptions on those with mental illness,80 and others have found that
coverage of the

1999 Columbine shooting led to existing policies being more strictly

followed and

enforced,81 but none have performed a newspaper content analysis to determine the impact on public
opinion. With easy access to news media outlets and public opinion polls on gun control, an
opportunity exists to look at how mass shooting saliency impacts public perceptions. This study
seeks to fill the research gap by asking the following: when mass shootings become salient in the
news media, does the saliency of the story impact public opinion on the importance of gun control?
And if it does, what types of coverage have greater impact?
ORGAl'JIZING THE PUBLIC CONCIOUSNESS: THE NEWS MEDIA AS AGENDA SETTER

Tbe01iifl1g tbe NeJvs Media as Pllblic Opinion Director
Much has been written about the effect of the news media on public perceptions. Scholars
have said that discourse in general, of which the news media plays a major part, influences the
formation of public opinion.82 Discourse has long been thought to play an important role in
informing the public's view on issues. It binds the social fabric of public opinion83 and is
"indispensable to the organization of the public mind."84 Public opinion becomes coherent through
the give and take of public discourse, in which ideas are debated, lines are drawn, and groups form
together around issues that they deem important. Theoretical writings have posited that the news
media's function in this discourse could be to influence public opinion by poi nting readers' attention
to certain stories. This is accomplished by giving more time to certain stories over others, or even, as
Lippmann would say, through censorship.8s Put another way, news media outlets have the power to
decide which information on a story is given and which information is withheld.86 Leading the
public's attention to certain stories, according to Lippmann, organizes public opinion along the lines
of what the news media views as important: " ... the newspapers necessarily and inevitably
reflect ...organization of public opinion."87 Though Lippmann failed to reinforce this assertion with
empirical data, he provided detailed theoretical and analytical insights into the power of the news
media to impact public opinion.
Later theoretical writings on the news media's influence on public opinion focused
Lippmann's broad claims in more nuanced ways. Scholars made an important distinction in how
exactly the news media's influence functions, characterizing it less as a factor that changes public
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opinion and more as an "agenda-setter" for what issues that public should be thinking of and having
opinions about. Cohen

said it best: "[The press] may not be successful much of the time in

(1963)

telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think
about."88 Kurt and Gladys Engel Lang

(1966)

echoed Cohen's assertion, offering that the mass media

directs public attention by "suggesting what individuals in the mass should think about, know about,
have feelings about."89 Though these claims are similar to Lippmann's characterization of the news
media as opinion organizer, Lippmann also asserted that the news media "intensified" public
opinion, which these scholars argue against.90 The news media acts less as an opinion changer and
more as an opinion director, pointing its figurative finger toward the issues on which the public
should be keeping its collective eye.
To some scholars, the news media's attention-directing function in tandem with its constant
movement between stories creates a perpetual cycle of rising and falling interest. As the news media's
attention to an issue decreases, a new issue takes its place. Anthony Downs has dubbed this
phenomenon the "issue attention cycle."91 Scholars have shown that the news media not only directs
the public's attention to certain issues, but also contributes to the cycle of increasing and decreasing
public valuing of issues. 92 Ultimately, the news media has been characterized not as

an

opinion

changer, but as an agenda-setter, a factor in determining what issues the public thinks and cares
about.

Conjil7Jlatiotl rifthe Agenda-SefttiIg Process atld Illumination rif hOJJI it FlttlctiotlS
Many scholars have run various types of studies to observe the different ways that news
media sets the public opinion agenda, though few have focused specifically on the issue of gun
control. McCombs and Shaw

(1972),

employing survey data, found that "voters tend to share the

media's composite definition of what is important," which they thought "strongly suggest[ed] an
agenda-setting function of the mass media."93 This study was subject to some limitations. For one, it
focused more on voters and less on the public as a whole, and it may not be possible to generalize
from voters, who are more likely to be informed, to the public as a whole. Additionally, McCombs
and Shaw acknowledged that it did not necessarily prove the agenda-setting function, as the
correlation between the news media's mention of political players and the measure of voters' political
interest in them could be a result of the news media accurately predicting what the public might want
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to hear94. Despite these drawbacks, the study still provided an early look at how the agenda-setting
function might be empirically tested.
Many other studies have since been completed on the agenda-setting function of the news
media. Scholars have found that news media agenda-setting can influence the speed at which
policymaking takes place, while others have discovered that it can reinforce political interest in the
public.95 Tan and Weaver (2007) used NeJV York Times coverage of events from

1946

to 2004

correlated with Gallup's Most Important Problem question to take a long-form perspective on the
agenda-setting function of the media. In general, they found a positive correlation between media
coverage and public opinion, suggesting that the public viewed salient issues as the more important
ones.% However, this year-by-year approach takes a broad look at broad issues, whereas a monthly
look at the media mentions and the Mostlmportant Problem question applied to a specific issue may
be more useful to demonstrating the particulars of agenda-setting.
To engage in this month-by-month analysis of agenda-setting, Winter and Eyal's

(1981)

findings in their study on agenda-setting in the Civil Rights Issue will be helpful. In that study,
mentions from the NeJv York Times were correlated with Gallup polls on a monthly basis. In addition
to finding a strong correlation between the two, the scholars discovered that a time-lag is necessary
when testing for agenda-setting. Analyzing content from one month prior to a poll, they discovered,
leads to stronger correlations, suggesting that it takes about four to six weeks for the public to adopt
the agenda set by the news media.97 Consequently, when determining how mass shooting coverage
may impact the public's perception of gun control, it would be useful to employ a similar time-lag.
Though the agenda-setting effect has been confirmed in many instances, some studies have shown
that it is not enough for the news media to mention an issue - how the news media covers the issue
can influence agenda-setting. One study found that gun control coverage focusing on citizen activists
groups may have greater influence on public opinion than coverage of the efforts of politicians,
meaning the angle of coverage can influence agenda-setting effects.98 Medium matters as well, with
internet stories shown as more likely to spur political interest than other forms of news media.99 The
takeaway from these studies is that counting mentions is not enough when analyzing the agenda
setting effect; studies must acknowledge that differing angles can influence how important the public
views an issue to be.
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HYPOTHESES
A number of testable hypotheses arise from the literature and the study at hand. The primary
hypothesis states the following:
H1:

The more mentions that appear of a mass shooting in the New York Times, the

Washington Post, the Los Angeles Times, the USA Todqy, and the Cbicago Tribllne , the

higher the percentage of people who think gun control is the most important
problem facing the United States will be in the month following the coverage.
This hypothesis operates under the theory that news media organize, direct, and have a role in
leading public opinion. According to this theory, as news media cover mass shootings, issues of gun
control become more salient in the public consciousness. The increased awareness of mass shootings
and gun control issues then leads the public to value gun control more, to see it as a more important
issue. Though more on this will be covered in the "Design and Methodology" section, it is important
to note that the hypothesis specifically mentions the public opinion in the month after the shooting
as a result of taking Winter and Eyal's time-lag into consideration.
In line with Smidt and others, a number of hypotheses about the differing angles of mass
shooting coverage follow from the primary hypothesis. Not only will this study test the agenda
setting effect of total mentions in these newspapers, it will also test how differing frames influence
agenda-setting. The hypotheses in the table below account for the possibility that different frames on
maSs shootings will influence how the news media's agenda-setting works (if it is there to begin with).
Each frame is predicted to have a positive correlation with public opinion on the importance of gun
control because if it is true that total mentions correlate positively with public opinion (Hl), then it
would follow that each frame would also correlate positively (H2-H7). It would not make sense if
one of the frames had a negative correlation when the frames in total correlate. It would not make
sense if one of the frames had a negative correlation when the frames in total correlate positively
since the frames are just subsets of total mentions.
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Table 1: Hypotheses

HZ: The more articles that appear in the aforementioned newspapers that take a "gun legislation"
frame to mass shootings, the higher the percentage of people who think gun control is the most
important problem facing the United States will be in the month following the shooting.
\9

H2a: This frame will show a stronger correlation with public opinion than all other tested
frames.

H3: The more articles that appear in the aforementioned newspapers that take a "mental illness"
frame to mass shootings, the higher the percentage of people who think gun control is the most
important problem facing the United States will be in the month following the shooting.
\9

H3a: This frame will show a stronger correlation with public opinion than all other tested
frames except for "gun legislation."

H4: The more articles that appear in the aforementioned newspapers that take a "shooter profile"
frame to mass shootings, the higher the percentage of people who think gun control is the most
important problem facing the United States will be in the month following the shooting.
•

H4a: This frame will show a stronger correlation with public opinion than all other tested
frames except for "gun legislation" and "mental illness."

H5: The more articles that appear in the aforementioned newspapers that take a "victim profile"
frame to mass shootings, the higher the percentage of people who think gun control is the most
important problem facing the United States will be in the month following the shooting.
•

H5a: This frame will show a stronger correlation with public opinion than "changing
security" and "general mentions," but a weaker one than all other tested frames.

H6: The more articles that appear in the aforementioned newspapers that take a "changing
security" frame to mass shootings, the higher the percentage of people who think gun control is
the most important problem facing the United States will be in the month following the shooting.
•

H6a: This frame will show a stronger correlation with public opinion than "general
mentions," but a weaker one than all other tested frames.

H7: The more articles with general mentions of mass shootings that appear in the aforementioned
newspapers, the higher the percentage of people who think gun control is the most important
problem facing the United States will be in the month following the shooting.
«I

H7a: This frame will show a weaker correlation with public opinion than all other frames

However, the frames are predicted to have varying levels of strength of correlation. News
articles that frame mass shootings in reference to the issue of gun control, whether directly or
indirectly, are predicted to have higher correlations. The "gun legislation" (GL) frame is predicted to

have the strongest correlation because it direcdy references the issue of gun control. Theoretically, a
high volume of articles that frame a mass shooting in relation to gun control will more overtly direct
reader attention to the issue of gun control than other frames, fostering public awareness of the
problem and leading the public to view it as more important. The "mental illness" (MI) frame is
predicted to have the second strongest correlation because it references an important sub-issue of
gun control. While they do not reference the issue direcdy like the GL frame, articles that follow the

MI frame

will still lead the public to see the gun control issue as more important.

Those frames that look at the human aspect of the mass shootings are predicted to have
weaker correlations than those that reference the issue, but stronger correlation than those that
examine issues largely unrelated to gun control. The "shooter prome" (SH) frame is predicted to
have the third strongest correlation among all of the frames. While it does not direcdy reference gun
control in relation to a mass shooting, it does reference a reason some people may support gun
control: limiting access to guns to certain citizens. Consequently, it may bring gun control to the fore
of the public consciousness more than other indirecdy related frames. The "victim prome" (V) is
predicted to have the fourth strongest correlation because articles that take that angle reference a
possible consequence of gun control policies without necessarily bringing up the issue of gun
control. Articles that use the V frame may lead the public to think about gun control, but they also
may elicit emotional responses that do not necessarily raise public cognizance of gun control.
Those frames that either reference different issues or no issues at all are predicted to have
the least strong correlations. The "changing security" frame (CS) is predicted to have the fifth
strongest correlation because it directs reader attention to a divergent issue: alterations to institutional
protections against violence, such as police or warning systems. As a result, it would follow that this
frame would theoretically lead the public to become more aware of different issues than gun control
and value those problems more. Finally, the "general mentions" frame (G) is predicted to have the
weakest correlation because those articles do not reference any issues of gun control or security. The
G frame refers to all articles that cursorily mention a mass shooting in the context of the article's
larger focus.
RESEARCH DESIGN
To test these hypotheses,

I ran a series of bivariate correlations between

media mentions of a

mass shooting in one month and the percentage of people who say gun control is the most important
problem facing the country in the following month. Data collection consisted of two main parts:
media content analysis (counting and coding of mentions) and public opinion poll collection.

My

independent variable is then newspaper mentions of mass shootings, and my dependent variable is
public opinion on how important of a problem people perceive gun control to be.
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The media content analysis focused on six mass shootings, here listed in chronological order:
the Red Lake Massacre (2005), the Virginia Tech Massacre (2007), the Binghamton Shootings (2009),
the Fort Hood Shootings (2009), the Aurora Colorado Theater Massacre (2012), and the Newtown
School Massacre (2012). These shootings were chosen because they were the six most deadly public
mass shootings in the past 10 years (excluding the recent Washington Naval Yard Shooting, which
was too recent to analyze using this model), meaning they would be more likely to gain media
traction. lOa
For each mass shooting, the number of instances the Nelv Y01:k Times, the WasbillgtotJ Post, the

Los Atlgeles Ti",es, the USA Todqy, and The Chicago Tribune ran articles on or mentioned the mass
shooting in the month follm.ving were counted. Each article was coded as either GL, MI, SH, V, CS,
or G. The total mentions from all five of. the papers were then grouped by month, as were the coded
mentions. In instances where newspaper mentions of the mass shootings overlapped, the mention
data were grouped together since the unit of analysis is broadly "mass shooting newspaper mentions
per month," with a total of 57 months.
These newspapers were chosen because they represent a variety of regions in the country,
are all national papers, and have large circulation.lol By covering a wide variety of regions and using
widely circulated papers, the hope was the newspaper mention counts could be generalized to
represent the country's public consciousness as a whole and that they would represent readership
across the United States. Coding for each of the aforementioned frames utilized the following
guidelines:

100
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Table 2: Article Coding Guidelines
Example

Frame

Definition

GL

Discusses a mass shooting from

"Gun control groups said that they admired the efforts,

the angle of implementing or

but that they would never carry the weight of

altering gun control legislation,

legislation to expand the number of gun buyers who

arguments for or against gun

are subjected to the background check system ..."
'White House Makes Moves to Bolster Gun

control, etc.

Safety" Nel}} York Times, 6/12/13

MI

Discusses a mass shooting from

"According to a research review published this year in

the angle of mental stability,

Annals of General Psychiatry, most people with

new approaches to mental

Asperger's who commit violent crimes have serious,

health, altering illness in regards

often undiagnosed mental problems... "
"Predicting Who's at Risk for Violence Isn't

to mental illness and guns, etc.

Easy" USA Todqy, 12/22/12
SH

Discusses a mass shooting from

"She thought Cho Seung Hui exuded loneliness, and

the angle of profiling the

she volunteered to teach him by herself, to spare her

shooter, explaining his

colleagues ... "
"Student Wrote About Death and Spoke in

motivations, detailing his
personal history or family life,

Whispers, But No One Imagined What Cho

etc.

Seung Hui Would Do" Washington Post J

4/18/07
V

Discusses a mass shooting from

"Roberta King was ... as passionate about helping

the angle of the victims'

others as she was about teaching."
"Victim of Binghamton Shootings Is

backgrounds, providing

CS

eulogies, detailing memorial

Remembered for Her Compassion" Net}} York

plans, etc.

Times, 4 /5/2009

Discusses a mass shooting from

The military remains vulnerable to another Fort Hood

the angle of changing or

like massacre with religious radicalization on the rise

enhancing security to prevent

and too little attention being paid to internal threats,

future shootings, any security

Pentagon officials said Friday... "
"Port Hood Report Critical of Officers"

pitfalls in regards to the
shooting, etc.
G

Chicago TributJe, 1/16/2010

Any general mention of a

"Yes, they have thoughts on Aurora. Yes, gun violence

shooting in articles not

affects these gold medalists. Yes, mass shootings will

primarily about the shooting.

always impact the sport . . . "
"Even at the Olympks, Athletes in the Sport
of Shooting Pace Questions about Gun
Violence" Washington Post, 7/31/2012

Public opinion data were collected from Gallup.com. The monthly question of the most
important problem facing the United States was used to gauge how important people found the issue
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of gun control to be. The exact wording of the question is ''What do you think is the most important
problem facing this country today?" It is an open-ended question in which respondents can answer
whatever they like. Gallup pollsters then code each response according to a set of categories, one of
which gun control. Gallup poll data were collected for the month after the coverage to account for
Winter and EyaYs time lag theory. Since the most important problem question is from a national
polling source, it may be used to reflect national perceptions on the importance of gun control.
Once both the newspaper counts were complete for each month in the year, the total
mentions of a mass shooting in each month were correlated with public opinion on the importance
of gun control in the following month. A one-tailed correlation was used to test for direction and
strength of correlation. Direction here is important because the research is trying to determine
whether increased mentions of mass shootings influence increased public belief in gun control's
importance. Further, each of the coded mentions, grouped as "mentions per month," were also
correlated with public opinion in order to see which types of mentions had stronger correlations with
public opinion. Again, these were one-tailed correlations, testing for the strength and direction of
correlation.
Two additional sets of correlations were also run to test for causality. Whereas the initial
correlations tested the strength and direction of the relationship between mentions/coded mentions
at time zero (l'vho) and public opinion one month later

(MTO+l), the

next set of correlations tested the

relationship between mentions/coded mentions and public opinion in the same month, or both at

MTO. Further, the last set of correlations tested the relationship between mentions/coded mentions at
MTO and public opinion in the previous month (MTO-l).
mentions at

MTO to

public opinion at

MTO+1,

If the causal pattern flows from media

the relationship between mentions/coded mentions and

public opinion both taken at MTO should be weaker than the one found at

MTo and MTO+l.

relationship between mentions/coded mentions and public opinion at lVho and

MTO-1

If the

were found to

be more strongly positive than the relationship between mentions/coded mentions and public
opinion at

MTO and MTO+l,

this would suggest the inverse of this study's proposed hypothesis.

Ultimately, using this model, it will be possible to test the direction and strength of the relationship
between mentions/coded mentions to determine if media mentions of mass shootings influence
public opinion on the importance of gun control, and whether this causality flows in the direction
this study would expect_
DATA
Table

3 provides the correlation between total mentions of mass shootings per month and

the percentage of people who answered that gun control was the most important problem facing the
country in the Gallup polls. Correlations are shown for MTO,

MTO+J, and MTO-l

.
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Table 3: Total Mass Shooting Mentions and Public Opinion on the Importance of Gun Control
Total Mentions
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (i-tailed)

N

Note:

Gun Control

Gun Control

Gun Control

Importance MTO+I

Importance MTO

Importance MTO-I

.658**
.000
57

.573**
.000
57

.339**
.005
57

**. Correlatlon I S slgruficant

at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).

Table 4 presents a correlation matrix of the total coded mentions grouped by month. These
coded mentions were correlated with MTO, MTO+1, and MTO-l in order to test hypotheses two through
seven.
Table 4: Correlations between Coded Mentions of Mass Shootings and the Public's Opinion on the
Importance of Gun Control

GL Pearson Correlation
Sig. (i-tailed)
MI Pearson Correlation
Sig. (i-tailed)
SH Pearson Correlation
Sig. (i-tailed)

V Pearson Correlation
Sig. (i-tailed)
CS Pearson Correlation
Sig. (i-tailed)

G Pearson Correlation
Sig. (i-tailed)

Gun Control

Gun Control

Gun Control

Importance MTO+l

Importance MTO

Importance MTO-l

.832**
.000

.704**
.000

_533**
.000

.613**
.000

.595**
.000

.451**
.000

.188
.081

. 133
. 162

.042
.379

.35 1**
.004

.272*
.020

. 107
.215

.604**
.000

.500**
.000

.463**
.000

.633**
.000

.582**
.000

.280*
.017

Note: N=57
**.

Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (I-tailed).

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (l-tailed).
DISCUSSION

Total Mentions Correlated With Public Opi11ion
Analyzing the correlations conducted in the study provides more evidence for the influence
of newspaper mentions of mass shootings on public perceptions of gun control. The relationship
between total mentions of a mass shooting in the five newspapers grouped by mentions per month
and the percentage of the public that viewed gun control as the most important problem in the
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following month was positive and statistically significant. The Pearson's Correlation Coefficient was
.658, which was statistically significant at the .001 level. This strongly suggests that as newspaper
mentions of a mass shooting increase, so does the public's view on the importance of a problem gun
control is; this result is extremely unlikely to have been found by chance.
The flow of causality is uncertain, though. The subsequent correlations done when public
opinion is at MTO and MTO·l are weaker than the correlation done at MTO+l, but they are both still
fairly strong and significant at the .01 level. Winter and Eyal's (1981) estimated that it takes 4 to 6
weeks, or about one month, for the news media's influence to take effect on public opinion.
However, one would expect the relationship to dissolve when correlating opinion at MTO.l and
newspaper mentions at MTO because this would assume that public opinion shifts before the mass
shooting occurs.
The fact that the relationship is still positive and statistically significant when the time lag is
removed might indicate that public opinion may also influence how much the news media covers
mass shootings. Influence between public opinion and newspaper coverage could be a two way
street. Although, this correlation is weaker than the other two, it is possible that this positive
relationship could indicate the presence of an intervening variable influencing both public opinion
and the number of newspaper mentions. Therefore, while the initial correlation appeared to confirm
the primary hypothesis, the direction of causality is not entirely clear. This study suggests not only
that newspaper mentions of maSs shootings play a role in setting the agenda for public opinion On
the importance of gun control, but that public mood many influence what the news covers.
Coded Mentions Comlated JJlitb Public Opinion

When breaking the total mentions down into coded mentions, there is a noticeable variation
in the correlation between newspaper coverage in MTO and public opinion on the importance of gun
control in MTO+l. As predicted in H2, the "gun legislation" (GL) frame easily had the strongest
correlation, with a Pearson's Correlation Coefficient of .832, statistically significant at the .001 level.
As hypothesized, articles that focus on gun legislation have a stronger relationship with public
opinion in the month following the coverage than all other frames.
Monthly groupings of articles coded for the "mental illness" (MI) frame were not as strongly
correlated with public opinion as was predicted in H3, but still had a strong, positive, statistically
significant relationship with public opinion on the importance of gun control. The Pearson's
Correlation Coefficient of .613, significant at the .001 level, made articles using the MI frame the
third most influential frame of the six studied. This means that, contrary to expectations, articles that
reference the mental illness subtopic of gun control in regard to mass shootings are not the second
most influential at leading public opinion on gun control, though they may still be very influential in
framing gun control perceptions.
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Contrary to H4's prediction that the "shooter profIle" (SH) would be the third strongest,
monthly groupings of articles coded for the SH frame turned out to have no statistically significant
relationship with attitudes on gun control. In fact, it was the only frame that had no statistically
significant relationship with public opinion. As such, the SH frame appears to be unimportant in
setting the agenda on public views on gun control.
The monthly groupings of articles coded for the "victim profIle" M frame also did not fall
in their expected correlation strength ranking. Though H5 predicted the frame would be the fourth
strongest correlation of all the frames, it instead turned out to be the weakest among those that had a
statistically significant correlation. The correlation between groupings of articles employing the V
frame had a Pearson's Correlation Coefficient of .351, statistically significant at the .01 level. While
the V frame is not as useful for predicting how important gun control is to the public as the other
statistically significant frames, it still may have some use in setting the agenda for public opinion on
gun control.
Monthly groupings of articles taking the "changing security" (CS) frame correlated more
strongly than expected with public opinion in the month following the shooting. H6 predicted that
articles employing a CS angle to mass shootings would have a weaker relationship than all frames
except the G frame, but the correlations showed that those articles have the fourth strongest
correlation of all the frames, with a Pearson' Correlation Coefficient of .604 statistically significant at
the .01 level. This correlation coefficient was almost as strong as the MI frame. Consequently, this
shows that the CS frame may have a connection with higher percentages of people viewing gun
control as a more important issue, regardless of whether CS articles reference gun control directly. It
appears that merely reference changing rules of any sort in terms of mass shootings may impact how
important people view gun control to be.
The monthly groupings of the "general mention" (G) frame, which were predicted in H7 to
have the weakest correlation, are shown in this study to have the second strongest correlation.
Groupings of the G frame at MTO were correlated with the percentage of people who view gun
control as important at MTO+! with a coefficient of .633, statistically significant at the .01 level. This
means that, even though general mentions appear in cursorily related articles, just mentioning a mass
shooting frequently may raise public awareness enough to lead the public to view gun control as
more important. Contrary to the prediction H7, this research shows that the G frame has the second
strongest correlation, making 1t a more useful predictor for public opinion on the importance of gun
control. The flnal strength-ranking for the frames was then: GL

> G >

MI

>

CS

> V >

SH.

Again, causality is not entirely clear in each of these correlations, as public opinion at MTO.!
also has a strong, positive, statistically significant relationship with GL, MI, CS, and G articles
grouped at MTO. Newspaper coverage may not set the agenda for public opinion completely; it may
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be influenced by the public as well. When a higher percentage of the public views gun control as
important, the news media may respond by focusing more attention on related stories, like mass
shootings. While the majority of these frames, excluding SH, demonstrate that these newspapers may
play an agenda-setting role for public opinion, the many positive, statistically significant relationships
between mentions at MTO and public opinion at MTO-l indicates that the public's valuing of gun
control may lead what newspapers cover as well. In fact, it is even possible that the news media and
public opinion could be locked in its own cycle. \X'hen public opinion views gun control as more
important, news sources could be more likely to cover mass shootings, which could then make the
public more likely to vie\v gun control as an important issue, etc. However, this question is outside
the scope of this study.
CONCLUSION
There are some obvious drawbacks to this study, primarily that correlations cannot
demonstrate true causality. However, the statistically significant correlations suggest there is a
powerful relationship between the two, and that the news may have an agenda-setting effect in its
coverage of mass shootings, similar to previous studies mentioned in the literature. Additionally, it is
possible that the newspapers used for this study are not as generalizable as one would assume,
though that seems unlikely since they are all large, national, widely circulated newspapers (both online
and in print) that tap into and reflect the public consciousness.
A larger drawback of this analysis is found in the Gallup Poll Most Important Problem
Question results. There are many instances where the percentage of people who respond that gun
control is the most important problem facing the nation is a tenth of a percent, half of a percent, or
some other fraction of a percent. Consequently, those instances where the percentage of people who
respond to the question with "gun control" reaches

6

percent seem very large by comparison. While

the study showed newspaper mentions in MTO to have strong, positive, and statistically significant
correlations with public opinion at MTO+l, the substantive significance of the results is lacking. An
increase in newspaper mentions of a mass shooting may relate to the public viewing gun control as a
more important issue, but whatever influence increased mentions has may only alter public opinion
by a fe\v tenths of a percent. Newspaper coverage may have a statistically significant relationship with
public opinion in this instance, but it may not impact it all that much.
What this study does show, however, is that discourse surrounding mass shootings has a
relationship with the public vie\ving gun control as more important_ Even if more media mentions do
not correlate \vith drastic alterations in public opinion, the statistical significance of the correlations
suggests that news media mentions of mass shootings should not be discounted as part of public
opinion formation on the importance of gun control. This study also demonstrates that it is not just

RES PUB LIe A 1"41

general news discourse that matters; the manner in which the news media covers mass shootings
changes the relationship.
Further, this study showed that mass shooting mentions in a month have a stronger
correlation with opinion in the month following these media mentions. But public opinion may still
have some impact on what newspapers decide to cover. Future studies might look more extensively
at how public opinion may lead news media mentions, or to see if there is an interacting variable that
influences both newspaper mentions of a mass shooting and public opinion on the importance of
gun control, such as discourse from interest groups or politicians.
The lack of these considerations in this study should not detract from what was found. This
study shows that newspaper discourse on mass shootings has a statistically significant relationship
with public opinion on the importance of gun control, meaning it should be an important
consideration when thinking of how public opinion on gun control is formed. Moreover, this study
showed that how mass shootings are covered is important in determining the strength of that
relationship. This study, by demonstrating the importance of the relationship between news
discourse on mass shootings and public opinion on the importance of gun control, opens up
possibilities for future studies on the formation of public opinion in regards to gun control and mass
shootings. The results of this research show that news discourse on mass shootings, as Cooley (1909)
said, may be crucial to the organization of the public mind.
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THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE DARK HORSE IN AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY
Lexi Baltes

Abstract: Tbis research examilles the extent to Ivhich the Supreme Court bas the pOlver to influence public opinion.

There is a good deal ofconsensus in the literature regarding the influence of public opinion on the Supreme Cotll1.
HOIVever, a relatively small pool of contradictory research attempting to tum the casual armvjivm the Court to the
public tlJJdersc01�s thefact that tbe question oftvhether or 1I0t a t/ynamic, back-andforth relationship exists is still open
for debate. Usitl!! a p011ion of the Ivork done by Erikson, MacKtlCn and Stimson itt The Macro Polity (2002) as a
mode� and relyill!! heavily on James Stimson's public mood data and salient Supreme COtilt decisionsfronl 19692008, this stllt/y asserts that the Supreme COUlt has the pOIVer to influence the public mood on salient ismes, especially
Ivith regard to highly unanimous decisions. Consequently, this stut/y suggests a dialogue exists behveen hvo grotrps that
}vere never intended to speak.
INTRODUCTION
Public opinion carries great weight in the American form of democratic government. A
government by the people and for the people implies the certainty of a back-and-fortb dialogue
between public preferences and institutional accommodations. In order to ensure the government
acts faithfully, certain restraints are in place-namely, electoral accountability and legitimacy through
acceptance. In this way, the public controls the thermostat, choosing the ideological temperature of
the policy produced, enforced, and allowed to stand.10'
The public has tremendous power and influence over the governing of the nation, yet it is
well documented that, at least at the individual level, the public is not well informed about political
issues.'03 But how, and how effectively, is the public calling the shots for a global superpower?John
Zaller (1992) and James Stimson (1991; 1994) explain that by relying on elite influence (politicians,
public officials, etc.) and other heuristics, the public manages to make rational decisions and control
the ideological thermostat in a systematic and predictable way. Public opinion is tied to governmental
action and positions. However,Jacobs and Shapiro are adamant about the diminishing
responsiveness to public opinion. They believe that politicians use the measurement of public
opinion "not to move their positions closer to the public's (as commonly assumed) but just the
opposite-to find the most effective means to move public opinion closer to their own desired
policies."104
This is a dangerous proposition for any branch of government, but what of the "least
dangerous branch," the branch theoretically isolated from the passions of the public and the passing
partisan tides? The interaction between the Supreme Court and public opinion may be both the most
interesting and least studied relationship for largely the same reason: it is the forbidden fruit of
government and politics, the relationship that was never supposed to be. However, in order to
102 Erikson, MacKuen, S timson 2002; Deutsch 1963; Easton 1953; Wlezien 1995
103 e.g. Converse 1962
104 J acobs & S hapiro 2002, p. 5 5
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understand politics today, the question must be asked: to what extent do Supreme Court decisions
have the power to influence public opinion and mood? There is a significant compilation of
scholarship suggesting the presence of the relationship between public opinion and its influence on
Supreme Court decisions, but not much more than defensive, nervous rhetoric regarding the reversal
of the causal arrow. This research, relying heavily on Stimson's public mood data and salient
Supreme Court decisions between 1969 and 2008, seeks to shed light on the extent to which the
"least dangerous branch" can influence the public at a level as fundamental as mood and opinion,
and investigate the implications the results have on the balance of power.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Over 50 years ago, Robert Dahl sparked interest in the Supreme Court's political presence.
He wrote, "As a political institution, the Court is highly unusual, not least because Americans are not
quite willing to accept the fact that it is a political institution and not quite capable of denying it," and
yet, "much of the legitimacy of the Court's decisions rest upon the fiction that it is not a political
institution but exclusively a legal one," (1957). The idea that the nation has turned a blind eye to the
incongruous attributes it associates with the Court only becomes clearer as partisan divide places
increasing credence on ideological position of issues and policy.
There is a good deal of consensus in the literature regarding the influence of public opinion
on the Supreme Court.105 Theory would suggest, in these more polarized times, this influence would
weaken or fade completely as Justices become more fixated upon an ideological stance regardless of
external influences. Nevertheless, in a relatively recent study of cases from 1953-1996, McGuire and
Stimson (2004) found that the Supreme Court continues to weigh their decisions against public
mood so as to issue decisions that have a chance of being enforced.
These findings are reminiscent of Dahl's influential propositions and an ample amount of
legitimacy hypothesis scholarship since then.'OG Recent scholarship suggests that public mood, even
after controlling for the "social forces" that influence both public and judicial mood, influences
constitutional interpretations espoused in Supreme Court decisions.'07 At the very least, this points to
the weighed and measured constraint placed on the Court based on its own forethought and self
preservation. Like other politicians, Supreme Court Justices seem to have a perception of the most
expedient position.IOB There is an established pattern of acknowledgement of, and respect for, public
mood in the decisions of the Supreme Court.

105

J\rIcGuire & Stimson 2004; Casillas, Enns, Wohlfarth 2010; Erikson, Stimson, MacKeun 2002
Mondak 1992; Baas & Thomas 1984; Jaros & Roper 1980; Murphy & Tanenhous 1968; Marshall 1987;
Johnson & Martin 1998
107 Casillas, Enns, & Wohlfarth 2010
108 Stimson, rvIacKuen & Erikson 1995
106

RES PUBLIe A 1�47

The presence of a unified voice from scholars regarding the existence of a relationship
running from public mood to Supreme Court decisions cannot be overstated when theorizing about
reverse causation. If the legitimacy of Supreme Court decisions depend, at least in part, on public
acceptance, then it follows that the Court would actively try to pull public opinion toward its
preferences. The idea of figuratively purchasing stability public opinion finds wide support among
scholars of the Supreme Court.I09 Referenced many ways throughout the literature, the term
"judicial capital" will hereby be used to indicate the "funds" used by the Supreme Court. The theory
maintains that the Court can use its judicial capital to purchase the legitimacy of a decision, but at
some point it will run out of capital and have to start saving again. This research is less interested in
determining the way in which the Court gains, spends, and otherwise uses this capital than it is with
advancing the notion that when purchasing legitimacy, the Court might also be purchasing public
opinion. The idea of judicial capital is a foundational theoretical justification that functions to situate
and legitimize this study within the larger body of literature.
Turning to the relatively small pool of research that looks at the influence of Supreme Court
decision on public opinion, it becomes clear that the question of whether or not a dynamic, or
biconditional, relationship between the Court and the public exists is still open for debate. Much of
the current literature concludes evidence is lacking to indicate any such relationship exists.1l0
However, there are flaws in both theory and design throughout this camp of research.
In one of the more prominent studies, Marshall (1987) finds that but for a small collection of
cases, Supreme Court decisions have virtually no effect on public opinion. He looks at the influence
of just eighteen cases using pre- and post-decision opinion poll data. The statistical limitations of
such a design go without saying, but what is more, the eighteen Court decisions used were from
varying issue domains. It is important to note that when researching the impact of Supreme Court
decisions it is difficult to justify looking at individual cases. It is well known that "(policy) is highly
cumulative, the result of a stream of decisions over cime." lll, The Court rarely rules singularly or
finally on any issue, and even when it does, its decision is still taken in concert with decisions on
other issues. Therefore, it is flawed to look at certain isolated hiccups in the Court's discourse and
far better to analyze its influence in light of the fluid voice espoused in a collection of decisions.
Other studies stop shott of actually investigating the influence of the Supreme Court on public
opinion because they conclude that people know too little to be able to systematically respond to

J09 Casillas et. a1. 2010; McGuire & Stimson 2004; Hetherington & Smith 2007; Mondak 1992; Caldeira &
Gibson 1992
lID
Blake 1977; Marshall 1987; Baas & Thomas 1984; Jaros & Roper 1980; Murphy & Tanenhous 1968;
Hetherington & S mith 2007
111
Erikson ct. aL 2002
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Supreme Court decisions.112 People generally lack political information and the motivation necessary
to process and correctly align themselves with ideological positions taken in Court opinions.l13
Therefore, these researchers conclude there is no reason to look further. This study is much less
concerned with knowledge and explicit awareness of Court decisions, but instead asserts that
awareness is not a requirement for potential influence. To believe otherwise is to discount ample
research in the way of heuristics besides knowledge that have been confidently considered to aid the
formation of "appropriate" public opinions, and ignore the reality that public mood may be an
airborne \r1rUS catchable absent direct contact.
Those finding a significant influence of Supreme Court decisions on public opinion114 are
relatively few in number and possess their own theoretical and logistical shortcomings. Mondak
(1992) finds that the Court can increase support for rulings, but at a price. This is consistent with the
judicial capital theory. However, it would seem that when measuring influence of the Court, analysis
ought not be limited to support for the decision, but perhaps better focused on ensuing change of
opinion, especially opinion on the issues about which the decision was determined. Furthermore,
Mondak's conclusions are drawn from a controlled experiment that utilizes hypothetical policy and
rulings, which exacerbates the limitations of the research.
Taking a unique approach, Franklin and Kosaki (1989) also find that the Supreme Court
influences public opinion. However, they do not measure influence in terms of increased support
for the Court's position on an issue. Instead, they measure the structural change of groups
supporting certain issue positions, finding that Supreme Court decisions lead to greater homogeneity
and clearer preferences between groups (1989). Though Franklin and Kosaki view this structural
change as the dichotomous alternative to increased support, in reality, it neither helps nor hinders the
theory advanced in this research; rather, it merely answers a complementary question regarding the
Court-public relationship. They also find that salient issues blunt the Court's impact because salient
issues are those about which people already have well-ordered beliefs. This is significant because the
study at hand looks only at salient issues and cases. Implications of evidence regarding Supreme
Court influence on these issues would seem to suggest that the Court has some power to change
minds, not to simply help form opinions. This study aims to complement Franklin and Kosaki's
work so as to offer a broader picture of Supreme Court influence on the public and offer clearer
implications about any such relationship.
Johnson and Martin (1998) support the conclusions drawn by Franklin and Kosaki, but
suggest even further limits on the Court's influence. They posit that the Court may influence the

1 12

Murphy & Tanenhous 1968
Hetherington &S mith 2007
114
Petrick 1968, Franklin & Kosaki 1989, Mondak 1992, Johnson & Martin 1998
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public in accord with the structural change hypothesis, but any kind of influence only occurs after the
first major ruling on a given issue: subsequent rulings have no effect. Tracking single issues across
time, the expectations for this study are fundamentally at odds with the limitations put forth by
Johnson et. al.

(1998).

In sum, a theoretically sound and scientifically verifiable approach to analyzing Supreme Court
influence on public opinion is lacking. The absence of a unified scholarly voice on the topic, and
even on the approach to studying the topic, is not altogether surprising, considering the relatively few
specific inqniries into the idea of Supreme Court influence on public opinion. Furthermore, there are
limitations inherent in the study of an institution with the power to handpick the issues it addresses
combined with the study of a free public whose preferences have only recenrly become well
documented. This research attempts to go some way towards filling this gap and standardizing the
approach through which future research on the topic might utilize, by implementing a new method
that pairs external validity with formulaic consideration for accuracy and error.
After determining that public opinion influences not only Supreme Court decisions but rather
the outputs of all three branches of government, Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson

(2002, 2008)

extend the thermostat analogy and turn the casual arrow around for Congressional policy-looking
at public mood!15 as a function of policy and finding a negative relationship. As policy becomes more
liberal the public mood becomes more conservative, or in other words, as policy moves in one
ideological direction, the public has a logical increased desire for policy in the other direction.

Macro Polity model will be

The

employed in this research to extend the analysis of mood as a function of

policy into the realm of policy espoused in Supreme Court decisions.
RESEARCH DESIGN AND HYPOTHESES
The central predication of this research is that Supreme Court decisions do, in fact, influence
public opinion. However, this proposition is not intended to act counter to evidence suggesting that
public opinion influences the Court; rather, it is a supplemental study aimed at uncovering a more
complete picture of this relationship as a two way street. One side of the street is paved, the other
currently in its primitive stages of construction.
In order to test the dynamic part of this relationship, the part that points the casual arrow from
Supreme Court decisions back to the public, I will use the portion of testing done in
that looks at mood as a function of policy

The Macro Polity

(2002, 2008) as a model. In their study, Erikson,

MacKuen, and Stimson create an index by awarding a

-1 (conservative)

or + 1 (liberal) to each piece

of significant (as defined in David Mayhew's two sweep test) legislation! 16, and then taking the
cumulative sum of these scores to create one score for each biennium. Using this score as the key

115 Stimson 2012
116 May hew 1991
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independent variable they run an Ordinary Least Squares regression to analyze the influence of policy
on public mood (using Stlmson's public mood data) controlling for the effects of the economy on
mood, specifically inflation and unemployment indicators. As previously mentioned, their testing
ultimately concludes there is a negative relationship regarding policy influence on mood; thus, a
representation of the thermostat analogy.
Based on this model, I approach Supreme Court decisions in much the same way that Erikson
et. al. approach policy. Looking at Court cases from

1969-2008,117 I consider only salient cases,1l8 and

of those, only cases involving race, religion, or sex (discrimination, privacy, etc.) issues119, There are
multiple defenses for this emphasis on salience. First, it is consistent with

The Macro Polity model,

which only looks at salient policy.'20 Second, it is most interesting to understand the public's
relationship and interaction with the Court on issues that matter most to both groups. Finally,
research has shown that the Court is most likely to defy public opinion on salient cases.'2' Therefore,
in an attempt to look at the back and forth between the Court and the public, it is best to look at
cases in which there is not complete harmony between the Court decision and public preference. The
idea here is that, whether or not the public is aware or has any knowledge of the decisions, salient
cases in these issue domains are the ones most likely to matter, which is different than influence; if it
were otherwise, this study would be irrelevant.
The restrictions mentioned above leave

146 cases

for analysis, with an average of just under

four cases per year. In accord with Erikson et. al., each decision was given one of five scores: -1,

0, 0.5, 1. Negative values indicate a conservative decision, positive values

-0.5,

indicate a liberal decision,

and zero indicates a decision that is neither liberal nor conservative.I22 A score of

-0.5 or 0.5 was

awarded when the decision was obviously narrow in scope or left open the clear possibility of a
different decision given slightly different circumstances.'23 The sum of the scores in each year was
produced to create a cumulative decision score per year.

117 This is a post-Warren Court case pool. The Warren Court is often said to be the most activist Court of all

time-here we look at the influence of supposedly less activist courts. This time period is also convenient, in
that public mood data becomes much more reliable around the 1960s.
118 Epstein and Segal (2000) provide a \.videly accepted operationalization of salient cases to be those appearing
on the front page of the New Ym:k Tillles the day after the decision was released.
11<) These three issue domains are broad enough to include a wide range of opinions, but they are also issues
about which people are not only likely to have formed opinions but those with which they have personal
experience.
120 E
rikson et. al. 2002
1 21 Casillas et. aJ. 2011
122 O
nly a handful of zeros were awarded, and all were cases in which the Court unanimously decided not to
decide and remand for more information.
123
In addition to a single primary coder, intercoder reliability was confirmedwith three additional coders
looking at a random sample of ten decisions from the case pool. There was 100 percent consistency across all
four coders in terms of the ideological direction of the 10 cases and 83 percent consistency as to the value
itself.

The cumulative decision score per year will be the independent variable of focus, representing
the annual nature of Supreme Court ourputs. Implementing Ordinary Least Squares regression, the
analysis will focus on the relationship between this independent variable and the single dependent
variable: change in public mood.124 Stimson's policy mood indicator is an amalgamated index that
produces a single score to represent the aggregate shift along the liberal-conservative continuum of
public mood over time by combining policy preferences of survey respondents across many different
issues. Stimson's mood data is publicly available125 and was last updated in

2011.

It is important to note that the data used in this research are not the raw mood scores. Instead,
for the purposes of this analysis, the value produced by taking the change in mood from the previous
year to the current year is used. Using a change score ensures that the direction of causality suggested
is, indeed, the one being tested. In the form of a quasi-experimental design, we have the mood
measure before the year of decisions, then the experimental treatment of Supreme Court decisions,
and then the mood measure following those decisions. By subtracting the pre-experimental measure
from the post-experimental measure, we can determine the effect of the experimental treatment.
Looking at overall mood as a product of time-lagged decision scores would be a useful avenue
for future research to pursue; however, the change score lends itself much better to the study at hand
for a variety of reasons.'26 Though change scores are limited to shorr term analysis, they ensure the
appropriate direction of causality, as mentioned above. Further, looking at change scores eliminates
the chance that any relationship suggested by the data is only a long-term, possibly spurious,
relationship. Isolating annual change in mood is therefore the best, though not the only, choice of
dependent variables for this study. Thus, the focus of the analysis will ask the question: does the
short-term change in tenor of Supreme Court decisions produce short-term change in mood?
Finally, with the annual decision score as the key independent variable influencing the
dependent change in mood, I also conrrol for fluctuations in the economy (inflation and
unemployment),127 and the ideal point'28 and ideology of the Court.'2' Both sets of scores are given
individually to each Justice. I took the average of these scores for each year to produce one ideal

124 Stimson 2012
125

These data are available at W\vw.unc.edu/ �jstimson/Data.html.

12<> Overall public mood is a cumulative, or developing, score, so to look at mood, rather than change in mood,

the effects would probably not be seen 'without a large time lag. This type of analysis is beyond the scope of
this research given the data collected. The case pool is 146 cases over 40 years, just under an average of four
per year. Each annual time lag would eliminate one data point from a relatively small pool. Future research
might additionally look at cases 10 to 20 years earlier so a time lag could be conducted with more confidence
and thereby add another dimension to the research.
127
It is well known that the state of the economy affects public mood (Erikson et. al. 2002); however, I
anticipate that its influence, and thus its relevance, will be diminished when looking at change in mood rather
than overall mood. Nevertheless, inflation and unemployment variables were included just to be certain.
'28
Martin & Quinn 2002
1 29 Segal & Cover 1989
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point score and one ideology score for the entire Court in each year.130 The Martin-Quinn ideal
point score offers a dynamic indicator of Court preference, with a new score given for every year an
individual Justice serves. The Segal-Cover ideology score, which assigns a single value to each Justice
for the duration of their time on the Court, offers a more stable and consistent indicator of Court
preferences. Thus, we can control for multiple aspects of possible influence of Justices' influence on
public mood that might bypass the Supreme Court decisions.
The expectation for this research is that there is an identifiable influence of Supreme Court
decisions on public mood, but I propose the nature of this relationship to be opposite that of the one
found when at mood as a function of Congressional policy. Whereas there is a negative relationship
between Congressional policy and mood, consistent with the thermostat analogy (as policy becomes
warmer/more liberal there is an increased desire from the public for cooler/more conservative
policy), I predict a positive relationship between Supreme Court decisions and public mood. The
Court is neither a representative nor elected institution, and therefore the public may not attempt to
control the thermostat in the same way they do a Congressional body. Rather, it is plausible, and here
expected, that the public listens to the Court as authoritative and final, recognizing their lack of
control over the unelected body. In this way, I propose that Supreme Court decisions act as a
recalibration of the thermostat, with the public meeting the Court closer to its espoused temperature,
and d,en taking any qualms to Congress from this new playing field.13!
Finally, I predict the level of agreement between Justices to make a difference. When looking
only at unanimous decisions, I expect the above stated positive relationship \vill become stronger. A
unanimous Court seems to put forth a certainty and finality that will be felt by the public. By the
same token, greater dissent within the Court will signal a lack of cohesion, certainty, and therefore
finality that will reduce the malleahility of public mood. Thus, I predict the relationship between

The idea of using the average score of the three most ideologically moderateJustices in each y ear was
considered but ultimately rejected. Though it is true that the more moderate Justices often act as the deciding
votes in salient cases, and therefore the ideal points and ideologies of these Justices have a greater influence on
the decision that ultimately reaches the public, this aspect is accounted for in the score given to each case.
Instead, these variables are meant to control for the influence that the nature of the Court and its members,
outside of its decisions, has on the public. While tIlls might be interesting, it is not the focus of the study and
could potentially cloud the results. It seems plausible that when people look at the Court they respond more to
aScalia than a Kennedy; therefore, the average of the entire Court is what the public sees andwhat they would
be influenced by (if at all) when considering decisions. In this way, these variables are supplemental and help to
control for knowledge of the Court and its decisions-since I do not see either knowledge or awareness as a
precondition for possible influence.
131 How the public responds toSupreme Court decisions is different than how it responds to theSupreme
Court. For the sake of theory, I propose that the public may indeed respond in accord with the thermostat
analogy regarding the makeup of the Court, whlIe at the same time demonstrating a positive relationship
regarding decisions put forth by the same Court. This is why it is important to ensure we are looking at the
decision of the Court absent the influence of individualJustices.
130

RES PUBLIe A 153

Supreme Court decisions with three or four dissents will be weaker, if it even exists, than the
influence of all cases.132
FINDINGS
The initial analysis looks at the influence of all the Supreme Court decisions in the case pool,
divided into annual units with a single cumulative case score, on the change in public mood. Using
annual decision scores, average ideology of the Court, average ideal point of the Court,
unemployment rate, and inflation rate as the independent variables, OLS determines that we are
explaining 24 percent of the variance, statistically significant at the 0.1 level. In this regression, annual
decision score is statistically significant at the 0.1 level and in the expected direction, with a positive
B-value of .319. Average ideology of the Court and average ideal point of the Court were also
statistically significant at the 0.1 level. It is important to note that inflation rate came nowhere near
approaching statistical significance as a predictor of change in mood,133 thus the model was repeated
without inflation as an independent variable.
In the new model, the independent variables still explain 24 percent of all variance; further,
this explanatory power is now statistically significant at the 0.05 level. The key independent variable
of annual Supreme Court decision score now has a strong positive relationship with change in mood,
and is statistically significant at the 0.05 level.134 For every one unit increase in the liberalism of the
annual cumulative decision score, there is a .323 unit increase in the liberalism of overall public
mood, holding all other variables fixed. These data are consistent with the hypothesis.
Brand new, issue specific public mood data is currently being produced by Stimson and his
team. Though the project is in its primitive stages, mood data for two issues, abortion and race,135 is
now available dating back to the late 1960's and early 1970's.136 Issue specific data allows the addition
of a deeper dimension to this research. It is a dimension ripe for exploration that will offer more
reliable results than attempting to track public opinion data using individual questions or cases as has
been done in the past. In order to use these data most effectively a race case decision score and an

132

As a point of clarification, I stand by the fact that knowledge and awareness of the decision are not
necessary preconditions for possible influence. The idea here is that the numerical divide representing the
degree of the dissent need not be known in order to be felt through alternate channels.
133
Lack of significance of both inflation and employment was anticipated due to the use of change scores as
the dependent variable; however because inflation received a p value of . 913, its inclusion may be interfering
with the results.
134
Average ideology of the Court also moves to statistical significance at the . 05 level, while average ideal point
of the Court remains statistically significant at the 0. 1 level.
135 Average ideology and average ideal point were added to the equation with these issue specific tests in mind,
otherwise it would seem the two variables were getting at largely the same thing. The more stable measure of
ideology was added for the very stagnant issue of abortion, and the more dynamic measure of ideal point was
added for the dynamic issue of race. Additionally, it was assumed that ideology would not be a good indicator
for race given the changing ideological position on race during this time period.
136
These data are produced in the same way as overall mood scores as discussed on page eleven, but for issue
specific polling data only. The data are available at www.unc.edu/ �jstimson/Data.html.
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abortion case decision score was created for each annual term using the same method as was used for
the initial analysis of all cases. Thus, we apply a test that looks at change in race mood as a function
of cumulative race case decision scores and change in abortion mood as a function of cumulative
abortion case decision scores.
The setup for this model is nearly identical. However, when looking at race mood as a
function of race case decision scores, the average ideal point of the Court is used as the key indicator
to pick up the influence of preferences of the Justices themselves. Race is a dynamic issue that calls
for use of a dynamic value; both the issue of race and public opinion towards racial issues have
changed considerably over the course of the time period under study. Furthermore, because of the
way the issue of race has evolved, ideology would not be an accurate way to get at preferences
regarding the issue. By the same token, abortion is a static issue;137 neither the issue, nor public
opinion towards it, has shown much variation over time. When looking at abortion mood as a
function of abortion case decision scores, the average ideology of the Court is used as the key
indicator to pick up the preference of the Justices themselves.
The race model does not pass the significance test, with a

p value of .1 03, meaning we cannot

reject the null hypothesis and infer a relationship exits. However, all things considered, and given the
relatively limited size of the data, a more elaborate, long-term study might not be dissuaded from
hypothesizing similarly in expectation of a more fruitful yield.!38
The abortion model, on the other hand, is statistically significant at the
nearly

41percent of the variance

0.1 level and explains

regarding change in abortion mood. The cumulative decision score

for abortion cases is a statistically significant indicator for predicting change in abortion mood at the

0.05 level. Interestingly, though not necessarily surprising, the relationship

between abortion decision

scores and abortion mood is strong and negative; for every one unit change towards more liberal
Supreme Court decisions regarding abortion there is a

-1.27 unit change in liberalism

of public mood

on the issue. In other words, more liberal Supreme Court abortion decisions lead to a public desire
for more conservative abortion policy.
Because abortion is systematically an outlying issue, !39 and attitudes towards it simply tend not
to change much at all, it is actually guite logical that regarding this particular issue there would be a
negative relationship between Court decisions and public mood. People will not simply accept
variation on this issue as authoritative and final. Furthermore, it is important to note that this

137 This is a trend verified by ample polling data tracking the issue.
138 Although we cannot infer a relationship exists vtith ap value of

. 103, if we were to entertain the idea that a
slightly larger case pool might reduce thep value the small amount necessary to infer a relationship exists, then
it would be worthy to note that, looking past the F test to the T test, the race case decision score is statistically
significant at the 0.05 level. Furthermore, the relationship is strong and positive.
139 e.g. Caldeira & Gibson 1992
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negative relationship concerning a generally unique issue does not cause the breakdown of the overall
model; rather, it allows us to theorize a better, more concrete model that looks at public mood as a
function of all of the Supreme Court decisions in the original case pool minus abortion cases.
Rerunning the OLS regression this way, we are able to explain 31 percent of the variance, statistically
significant at the .05 level. Furthermore, the Supreme Court decision score minus abortion decisions
variable is positive, strong, and statistically significant at the 0.01 level. For every one unit increase in
liberalism in decision score there is a .512 unit increase in the liberalism of public mood. These data
go a long way in providing additional evidence in support of the primary hypothesis of this study.
Next, we look to more rigorously examine this story about Supreme Court influence on public
mood and opinion by investigating the unanimity aspect of the decisions. There is a predicted
interaction here, meaning Supreme Court decisions do different things to public mood depending on
a third variable: degree of unanimity.l4D In this portion of the research, Supreme Court decisions are
grouped according to their number of dissents: decisions with zero or one dissents are considered
highly unanimous, while decisions with three or four dissents are considered to be highly divided.
Running the model exactly the same way for only those decisions put forth with unanimity, we
anticipate a stronger, positive relationship to emerge (see Figure 1). In fact, we find the unanimous
decision model to explain about 44 percent of the variance, statistically significant at the 0.05 level.
The decision score indicator for explaining change in mood is statistically significant at the 0.05 level
with a strong, positive B value of .93.141 This is consistent with the hypothesis and is logically
pleasing-the more certain the Court is of their decision, demonstrated through unanimity, the more
stock the public is willing to give the decision.
Finally, in order to examine the alternate segment of the hypothesis we conduct one last
regression using only highly divided decisions (three or four dissents) to detertnine the annual
decision score, and use this as our key independent variable for predicting change in mood (see
Figure 2). As expected, the findings indicate no statistical significance of any kind and do not even
lend a hint of directionality of a potential relationship for future study. In other words, Supreme
Court decisions completely lacking unanimity offer no explanatory power for determining the short
term change in public mood.

140 Here, degree of unanimity is taken solely as the number of dissenters. Though the limitation of this

operationalization is noted-not all dissents, or dissenters, are created equally.

141 Only 39 individual case scores qualified for this grouping of cases. This is a clear limitation, but also suggests

that the data may actually underestimate the reality of this relationship.
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Figure 1: Mood Change and Highly
Unanimous Decision Score (annual)

Figure 2: Mood Change and Highly
Divided Decision Score (annual)
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1 presents a summary of all fmdings. We can conclude that Supreme Court decisions

influence public mood and that this relationship is positive. Furthermore, the positive relationship is
strengthened by excluding abortion cases and when looking only at highly unanimous decisions (both
over all cases, and cases regarding a single issue). Thus, there is an interaction concerning Supreme
Court influence on public mood, depending on unanimity of the espoused decision. We cannot
conclude a relationship exists between decisions lacking unanimity and public mood
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Table 1: Change in Mood as a Function of Supreme Court Decisions

1
Decision Score

Unemployment

Ideology

Ideal Point

R Square

3

2

6

5

4

2.028**

2.241**

-2.642**

2.805**

2.592**

1.206

(.323)

(.514)

(-1.270)

(.512)

(.930)

(.257)

.312

.400

-.648

.409

.539

.218

1.216

.863

1.815*

1.193

.994

.511

(.217)

(.150)

(.418)

(.203)

(.221)

(.100)

.187

.156

.467

.175

.204

.093

-2.357**

-1.619

-2.575**

-2.143**

-.152

(-5.655)

(-6.969)

(-5.880)

(-6.404)

(-.456)

-.368

-.393

-.382

-.466

-.027

-1.785**

-1.871*

-1.621

-1.921*

-1.598

(-.546)

(.496)

(-.470)

(-.562)

(-.502)

-.282

.340

-.243

-.368

-.296

.241**

.257

.309**

.443**

.108

.406*

Note:
Each column indicates a separate regression: (1) all cases (2) race cases, (3) abortion cases, (4) abortion cases
eliminated, (5 ) highly unanimous cases, (6) highly divided cases.
*** P < 0.01
* p < 0.1 ** P < 0.05
The t-value is listed first, followed by the B-value in parentheses, and then the Beta Weight.
Average ideology and average ideal point are consistently negative, and frequcnrly significant. This can be taken
to mean that the public can respond negatively to the Court itself but dissociate that from acceptance and
internalization of the decisions.
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
This study does not attempt to upend the work suggesting public influence on the Supreme
Court. Instead, the research in this study deepens the understanding of the relationship between the
Court and the public in a way that begins to remedy the cognitive dilemma that Dahl wrote of so
many years ago. The Supreme Court does function as a political player in the American form of
government. The positive response hypothesis, oringinally put forth by Dahl
recendy rejected by Johnson and Martin

(1957), but more

(1998) and others, carries weight in American politics

beyond an attempt by the Court to ensure legitimacy of decisions. Certainly, this research does not
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try to advance the notion of a purely positive response from the public to Court decisions, and even
presents abortion as a counter example. The power of the Court to influence the public may be
limited (or enhanced) by judicial capital, among a number of other factors; however, multiple forms
of testing confirm that the Court can, and does, influence the public on salient issues (i.e. race,
abortion) at least some of the time. Thus, taken together with evidence that the public likewise
influences Supreme Court decisions, we are left with a picture of a paved and functioning two way
street-a dialog between groups that were never intended to speak.
At this point, it is worth reemphasizng the magnitude of the questions asked and answered in
this study. The Supreme Court is a small unelected branch of the great American democracy, and yet
the evidence holds from multiple angles that the American people are swayed and influenced by it in
ways not mirrored by the elected branches. Again, in a study of salient issues and cases about which
most people are said to have fixed opinions based on experience or proximity, we fmd a significant
positive relationship between Supreme Court decisions and subsequent public mood in the short
term. The Supreme Court plays a role in changing (not merely forming) the minds and mood of at
least some portion of the public.
Judicial activism is a term thrown around by politicians and the public alike. Though no one
defIninition necessarily encompasses the term better than another, it is generally thought to refer to
the amount of deference the Court gives to Congressional policy. This study, completely uninterested
in supporting or renouncing the accusations of judicial activism that seem wildly popular in current
political culture, may function to refine the working defInition of judical activism as it stands.
Perhaps activism should not be viewed in terms of deference granted to Congress by the Court, but
rather in terms of deference granted to the Court by the public. Indeed, this would make the Court
"active" in all senses of the word. Using judicial capital to create an artitude of deference from the
American public results in what appears to be popular internalization and acceptance of Supreme
Court decisions, for better or worse.142
Certainly, the conclusions drawn must be viewed in light of the data used in the study: three
salient issue domains and

40 years of Supreme Court decisions for a total of 146 salient decisions

delievered to the American people. Future research might look to extend this study by both
deepening and broadening the case pool. The time period limitation was discussed in an earlier
portion of this paper, but to reiterate, a larger time period would allow for a more confident use of a
time lag, which would add a long-term dimension to this short-term study. Furthermore, opening up

142 Whether or not theS upreme Court puts forth apolitical, or anti-agenda decisions is beyond the scope of this

paper although in this day of extreme polarization it is hard to imagine this might be so.
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the case pool to include additional issue domains would go a long way in solidifying the evidence put
forth in this analysis!43.
Nevertheless, certain limitations will always surround the study of the Supreme Court and
public opinion. Most notably, there is no systematic way to control for the social forces that effect
both Supreme Court decisions and public mood. This problem is greatly minimized, if not eliminated
completely, by the use of change in mood scores rather than raw mood scores, and the use of safety
net economic indicators. However, any attempt to expand this study to a long-term analysis will have
to grapple with the social forces that undeniably come with the terrain.
Finally, further investigation into the notion and workings of judicial capital logically follows
the study at hand. Theoretically, we can explain the evidence of the Court's influence on the public
by way of judicial capital: the Court uses its capital to acqnire legitimacy of its decisions from the
public, which subsequently turns into internal acceptance by the public. A scientific and
psychological understanding of how the transfer from external acceptance (legitimacy) to internal
acceptance (opinion) takes place would add a fluid and confident wholesomeness to the study of the
Court-public relationship. As it stands, the evidence produced in this research already points to a
well-developed, dynamic relationship between the Supreme Court and public opinion. It appears the
"least dangerous branch" is something of a dark horse in the conversation that is the American
Democracy.

143 Public mood is a cumulative index that considers public opinion on many issues (e.g., gun control,

healthcare. education); therefore, a model that includedSupreme Court decisions from as many of those issues
as possible would be best for this kind of study.
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THE MYTH OF THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS: CONFUCIAN VALUES AND
DEMOCRATIC SUPPORT
Xinlin Xu

Abstract: Literatllre 011 political ctllttlre claims COlljilcianism is incompatible with modern liberal democratic vallies.

HOlVever, little empirical evidence has been pl�sellted to prove the validity ofthis statement. This paper qllalltitativefy
stlldies the re!atiollship beflve", Cotifllcian vallies and democratic support in EastAsian society andfinds 110 negative
concdatio!l benveen the iJvo.
INTRODUCTION
In Clash ofCivilizations, Samuel Huntington predicts that the post-Cold War world conflict
would be a clash between western liberal democratic ideals and the eastern traditions of
Confucianism and Islam. It has been taken for granted by many that Confucianistp is a hindrance to
democratic consolidation, and its emphasis on maintaining a hierarchical society is claimed to
promote social inequality. Li

(2012)

argues that the role-based society that Confucianism endorses

discourages individualism and represses individual spontaneity. Confucianism requires that each
person behave in accordance with his or her role in society. All these Confucian ideas are found to
contradict modern democratic ideologies. This leads to a question: should countries that have
Confucian traditions alter their historical roots for the sake of democratization and democratic
consolidation? To answer this question, one must fIrst determine the compatibility of Confucianism
and modern democratic values. Though scholars have researched this topic extensively through
analysis of Confucian texts, the lack of empirical studies makes it diffIcult to draw defmitive
conclusions.
This paper examines how Confucianism directly and indirectly influences support for
democracy at the individual level and fInds no negative correlation between the two, as Huntington
had predicted. Confucianism is deconstructed into Elitism, Familism, Preference for Harmony, and
Respect for Authority. Their corresponding effects on individuals' support for democracy are
explored. This research does not merely examine the Confucian texts alone, but rather focuses on
the Confucian principles that are practiced by the society. It tries to provide a new interpretation of
the role Confucianism plays in the development of political culture in modern and post-modern East
Asian society.
LITERATURE REVIEW
The prevailing assumption, articulated by Huntington in his Clash of the Civilizatiolls, is that
Confucian thought is inherently anti-democratic. He believes that maintaining order and respecting
hierarchy constitute the central tenets of Confucianism, and that these ideas repress the development
of individualism. Other researchers, including Chenyang Li, question the compatibility of democracy
and Confucianism as well. Li argues that Confucianism embraces both numerical and proportional
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equality. Numerical equality indicates that all human beings are endowed with the same capacity for
moral culrivation.l44 Moral equality does not imply that all people have the same starus; rather, it
dictates that people with the same roles, such as fathers and husbands, are given the same kind of
responsibilities and entitlements. Li calls such equality "role based numerical equality."145
Proportional equality, or "equality relative to people's due," is another fundamental principle in
Confucianism. According to this notion, some form of division of labor based on social stratification
is necessary. Confucianism promotes the concept of xial1, which means virtuous and talented. A
person with such qualities must be well educated and equipped with superb moral achievement,
consequently deserving high starus in society.146 Though advocating that everyone should have equal
opporrunities to be educated, Confucianism recognizes that only xian people could bear the
responsibility of managing a state. Li also argues that with Confucian proportional equality comes
political inequalities that contradict the fundamental values underlying modern democracy.14' Based
on this analysis, political Confucianism is theoretically incompatible with modern notions of political
equality.
Other scholars have a more positive attitude towards the compatibility between Confucianism
and democratic ideals. Fukuyama argues that Confucianism is relatively tolerant and has potential
egalitarian implications, in that everyone is entitled to receive equal opporrunity to cultivate himself
or herself into a virruous being.148 Chen also argues that Confucian values are compatible with
modern liberal democracy. She claims the Confucian practices of "personal cultivation ...and the
moral responsibility of the holders of power" can prevent the tendency of over-materialization of
modern society.14' In addition, He summarizes four ideal-type models of the relationship between
Confucianism and democracy: conflict, compatible, hybrid, and critical.150 He notes in the conflict
model that Confucianism lacks the concept of negative liberty, which is the freedom to act free of
exterior interferences. But he also argues that the conflict model overstates the negative role of
Confucianism and overlooks the possibility of compatibility, consequently downplaying the
likelihood of a Confucian contribution to democratization. However, he admits that empirically, the
conflict model was much more accurate than the compatibility model in the early stages of
democratization in East Asia.ls1

144 Li

2012, 297

145 Ibid., 299
14 6 Ibid., 306

147 Li 2012, 308
148 Fukuyama 1995,
149 Chen 2007, 211
150 He 2010, 19
151 Ibid.,

30

25
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Some scholars have conducted empirical research on Confucianism as well as on political
culture in East Asian countries. In Democratization in Conftlcian EastAsia, Zhengxu Wang (2007) argues
that citizens with stronger self-expression values are more likely to be critical citizens. He shows that
economic development and social modernization in Confucian Asia results in stronger self
expression values which in turn give rise to democratic citizenship in these societies. Wang does not
examine how self-expression tendencies are correlated with Confucianism, but he does raise the
important concept of self-expression values, which have played a non-negligible role in shaping civic
culture in Confucian societies. Another empirical study done by Qi (2008) finds that Confucian
values are negatively correlated with democratic support. However, this study did not unravel the
mechanism through which such negative effects took place. Moreover, this study did not deconstruct
Confucianism and investigate which doctrine or concept specifically undermined democratic support.
At this point, no research has been done to depict the exact mechanism through which
Confucian thought affects support for democracy at the individual level. This study aims to
empirically test this correlation as well as the mechanism through which Confucianism can indirectly
affect individuals' support for democracy.
RESEARCH DESIGN
This research employs a large-N statistical model using data from the Asian Barometer (AB)
Wave 2 conducted between 2004 and 2008. The analysis presented in this paper is from a set of
structural equation models (SEM) employing Maximum Likelihood. Variables are first set up in an
assumed causal sequence, with each variable being regressed on all variables that precede it in the
chain. A path model enables the test of direct correlations between a particular Confucian value and
individuals' support for democracy. It examines correlations suggested by existing political culture
theories--such as the social capital theory--that can indirectly affect democratic support. This model
requires the deconstruction of Confucianism into measurable variables. Confucianism covers a broad
range of topics, such as humanity, morality, governance, and etiquetre. This study is based on the
theoretical framework raised by Weiming Tu, which divides the ideology into two categories: political
Confucianism and Confucian personal ethics.
In order to measure Confucianism, one needs first to define every variable in the model.
Elitism is one of the most prominent doctrines in Confucianism. Bell describes elitism as the "rule of
the wise;" it exemplifies the ideal that "the best and the brightest" should exert more influence in
order to build a good society.152 Confucius claims: "In government, the secret is Integrity. Use it, and
you'll be like the polestar: always dwelling in its proper place the other stars tuming reverently about

152 Bell 2006, 157
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it."153 This statement shows that political Confucianism values the virtues of a ruler. The ruler shall
establish himself as a moral exemplar and shall be well educated. Moreover, by likening an ideal ruler
to a "polestar," Confucius affirms his belief in the centrality of the role rulers perform in state
management.
Confucianism is also governed by a fundamental principle of harmony. In the political realm,
Confucianism means a well-rounded sociopolitical order governed by Ii, which involves "the
behavior of persons related to each other in terms of role, status, rank, and position within a
structured society."154 Such a strong tendency towards conformity is characterized as one form of
Preference for Harmony. Another aspect that exemplifies this charactetistic is Confucian personal
ethics, which advocates litigation avoidance in solving private disputes. As recorded in TheAllalects:
"I can hear a court case as well as anyone. But we need to make a world where there's no reason for
a court case."155 Confucianism claims that if everyone in society has courtesy and treats others in a
benevolent and altruistic manner, then harmony can be maintained and no dispute will take place.
The Confucian personal ethic states that it is necessary to obey family elders, whose decisions
should be followed and respected. It also stresses that one's personal behavior must honor the
ancestors. These claims are conceptualized as Familism in this study. Confucian petsonal ethic
encourages a harmonious and cooperative society by stipulating strict moral codes regarding respect
that must be performed among people with different hierarchical status. Moreover, two notions of
self are clearly differentiated in the Confucian tradition: the small self and the great self. The small
self is the limited self. It operates as a force of inertia that resists further development. The great
self, on the other hand, goes beyond self-centeredness. It not only relates to the family, dle society,
the state, and beyond to the world at large, but also establishes these relationships as "part of its own
sensitivity and concern."156 In other words, familism embodies a certain degree of self-sacrifice when
conflicts rise between personal and family interests.
The Confucian ideology also promotes a role-based society, where everyone has his or her
own entidements and responsibilities, according to which each individual acquires his or her due
equality. Confucius specifies five relationships: rulers and subjects, fathers and sons, husbands and
wives, elder and younger brothers, and finally friends and friends. He maintains that if individuals
observe these relationships properly, the society will stabilize itself. This observation of social
hierarchy is conceptualized as Respect for Authority.
When studying the correlation between political culture and democracy, it is worth examining
the social capital theory, which integrates sociology and economics to study civic tradition as well as
153 Confucius 1998, 11
154 Schwartz 1985, 67
155 Confucius and Hinton 1998, 132
156Tu
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political dynamics. In other words, besides direct correlations, Confucian values may affect
democratic support at the inclividual level through other mechanisms suggested by literature on
political culture. Social capital theorists have shown that social trust and democratic consolidation are
positively correlated.157 Inglehart argues that social trust is essential for people to view political
opponents as a loyal opposition and is strongly correlated with stable democracy.l58 Coleman (1988)
contends that a system of mutual trust is an important form of social capital through which future
obligations and expectations may be based. Regarding social trust, Putman draws a clistinction
between "thick trust," which is "embedded in personal relations," and "thin trust," which extends to
other people within the community. Though this clichotomy has been criticized for failing to
characterize the complexity of social trust in the real world, it is especially appropriate for stuclies
East Asian countries. Qi argues that Confucian personal ethics encourage people to "pursue interests
and seek social exchanges" within "in-groups"l59 where the "thick trust" applies. She also finds that,
in countries influenced by Confucianism, such particular trust is negatively correlated with general
interpersonal trust in society.I GO Therefore, this study will also incorporate General Trust as an
intervening variable to test whether Confucian values indirectly influence democratic support by
altering social capital.
Another concept raised by Inglehart is the postmaterialist value, which emboclies tolerance,
quality of life, self-expression, intellectual and aesthetic needs, etc.IGI He finds that postmaterialist
values contribute to people's declining confidence in hierarchical institutions, which in turn
strengthen their support for democracy.lG2 This theory has been confirmed in Wang's study on
democratization in Confucian East Asian countries. Based on this study, I incorporated Self
Expression values as another intervening variable. By influencing this variable, Confucian values
could possibly have an indirect impact on individuals' support for democracy. In measuring self
expression values, I extracted the elements comparatively relevant to democratic support.
Individuals' interest in and willingness to participate in politics is used as an indicator of the level of
self-expression values; individuals' potential for civil disobedience is another. John Rawls defines civil
clisobeclience as "politically-motivated, public, non-violent and conscientious breach of law
undertaken with the aim of bringing about a change in laws or government policies."IG3 Civil
clisobeclience is a call to conscience when no other means of self-expression is found adequate or

157 Inglehart 1997;
158 Inglehart 1997,
159 Qi 2008, 9

Putnam 1993 and 2000; Fukuyama 1995; Newton 2001
172-173

lGOIbid.,17-19
161 Inglehart 1997,109-130
162 Ibid., 299
163 Rawls,1971
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satisfactory. Therefore, the level of one's potential for civil disobedience reflects one's aspiration for
liberty and inclination to act in self-defense through public expression.
Democracy is a concept that resists attempts to objectively define. Schmitter and Karl
recapitulate nine "procedural minimum" conditions for democracy,l64 while Whitehead argues that all
definitions of democracy are contextually based.165 However, regardless of the definitions of
democracy, there is a consensus on the liberal political ideal that laid the foundation of democracy.
The ideal of liberty claims that all men are born equal, and as a result, they all have natural rights to
life, to property, and to civil freedoms of association. All individuals are equally entitled to exercise
the rights listed above, irrespective of their sex, race, religion, or political views. As implied by liberal
democratic ideals, political equality is a prereqnisite for modern democracy. Though unequal
distribution of political resources poses the question of whether political equality can be realized or
not, the goal of political equality still has its intrinsic merits.166 On the surface, the Confucian idea of
proportional equality, which implies that virtuous people should run the government, conflicts with
the modern ideal of political equality. Proportional equality resembles Dahl's concept of
guardianship, which states that only qualified elites can govern for the common good.167 Dahl argues
that guardians who make moral judgments based on the "science of ruling" and the knowledge of the
general good misunderstand the relationship between private and collective interests. Individuals who
give consent to guardianship based on economic performance are regarded as having lower levels of
democratic support.
I synthesized the literature on Confucianism and incorporated social capital and post
materialist theory to hypothesize a path model that depicts the mechanism by which Confucianism
generates impact on democratic support at the individual level. The final model of the correlation
between Confucian values and support for democracy in East Asia will be obtained by dropping all
the paths that show insignificant correlations. The selection of countries covers China, South Korea,
Japan, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. The reason I chose these cases is because my study is confmed to
East Asian countries. All these countries or regions either have had Confucianism as their offlcial
religion, such as South Korea and Japan, or are occupied by population that is culturally rooted in
Confucianism, such as Hong Kong and Taiwan.168
The hypotheses I proposed are outlined in Table

1 below.

Elitism, Respect for Authority,

Familism, and Preference for Harmony are exogenous variables, and the covariances between the
variables are represented by two-ended arrows. Causal relations between variables are represented by

164 Schmitter and Karl, 1991,
165 Whitehead 2002, 26

81-82

Dahl 2006, 36 and 84
53
168 Lew, Wang and Choi, 2001; Nosco, 1997

166

167 Ibid.,
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unidirectional arrows. The unexplained effects are represented by error 1, 2 and 3. In this model,
direct correlations between every single Confucian value and support for democracy are assumed.
Further, direct correlations between Confucian values and General Trust as well as Self-Expression
Values are also represented. The total effect that Confucianism has on democratic support is thus
calculated by adding up the direct and indirect effects.
Figure 1: Hypotheses

Elitism

Repseet for Authority

Familism

Harmony

MEASUREMENT AND OPERATIONALIZATIO
Table 1: Measurement of Variables

Variable

Measurement

Elitism

•

•

Description

"We should get rid of parliament and
elections and have a strong leader decide

For both statements, respondents

things."

disagree/ disapprove" were coded
as 1) "disagree/disapprove" as 2,

"People with little or no education should
have as much say in politics as highly
educated people."

choosing "strongly

"agree/ approve" as 3, and
"strongly agree/approve" as 4. The
sum score stands for the level of
elitism. The higher the score, the
higher the level of elitism.

Respect for

•

Authoriry
•

"Being a student, one should not question

Same as above. The higher the

the authority of their teacher."

score, the higher the level of
respect for authority.

"Government leaders are like the head of a
family; we should all follow their
decisions."

Familism

•

"For the sake of the family, the individual
should put his personal interests second."

•

"Even if parents' demands are
unreasonable, children still should do what
they ask."

Same as above.
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Preference

•

for
Harmony

Out-group
trust

"When one has a conflict with a neighbor,

Same as above.

the best way to deal with it is to
accommodate the other person."
•

"If people have too many different ways of
thinking, society will be chaotic."

•

"Generally speaking, would you say most
people can be trusted or that you must be

For the first question, "you must be

very careful in dealing with people?"

was coded as 1, "most people can
be trusted" as 2. For the second

•

"How much trust do you have in other
people you interact with?"

very careful in dealing with people"

question, "none at all" was coded
as 1, "not very much trust" as 2,
"quite a lot trust" as 3, and "'a great
deal of trust" as 4. The sum score
of these two questions indicates the
level of out-group trust.

Self
Expression
Values

•

"How interested would you say you are in
politics?"

•

"If possible, I don't want to get involved in
political matters."

•

"Citizens should always obey laws and
regulations, even if they disagree with
them."

For the first question, "not at all
interested" was coded as 1, "not
very interested" as 2, "somewhat
interested" as 3, and "very
interested" as 4. For the second and
third statements, "strongly agree"
was coded as 1, "somewhat agree"
as 2, "somewhat disagree" as 3, and
"strongly disagree" as 4. The sum
of these three scores stands for the
level of self-expression values.

Support for
democracy

•

•

"If you had to choose between democracy
and economic development, which would
you say is more important?"
''Which of the following statements comes
closest to your own opinion?"

For the flrst question, "economic
development is definitely more
important" was coded as 1)
"somewhat more important" as 2,
"equally important" as 3,
"democracy is somewhat more
important" as 4, and "democracy is
definitely more important" as 5.
For the second question, "it does
not matter whether we have a
democracy or not" was coded as 1,
"under some circumstances, an
authoritarian government can be
preferable" as 2, and "democracy is
always preferable" as 3. The sum
score of these two questions
indicates level of support for
democracy.

Source: Asian Barometer Wave 2
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A reduced model, which shows the correlations between variables, was produced by
dropping all the insignificant paths in the original one. The path coefficients are shown above each
arrow. The RMSEA is .017, which is smaller than the .05 required for a good model. Therefore, the
goodness of fit measure supports the adequacy of this model. The Chi-squire is not used here to test
the adequacy of this model. First, the finding of significance in the likelihood ratio test of a path
model can occur even with very small differences of the model-implied and observed covariance
metrics, especially given the large-N of the samples in this study, which is 9,813. Moreover, since
Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) tends to inflate Chi-square, RMSEA, an indicator less
influenced by sample size is used to measure the goodness of fit of this model.
Figure 2: Reduced Model

Elitism

Repseet for Authority

Familism

Harmony

Note: Comparative fit index

=

0.986; root mean square error of approximation (Rl\1SEA) = 0.017; 99 percent

confidence interval for RMSEA = 0.011-0.024; N=9813, Chi-square=28, p<O.OOOl.

Table 2:

Total Effects of Confucian Values on Democratic Attitudes
Elitism

Self-Expression
Trust
Democracy

Authority

Familism

Self-Expression

Harmony

Trust

.079

.056

.095

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

-.029

.000

.000

.000

.065

.009

.014

.162

.020

.061

In the model, no direct correlation is found between Respect for Authority, Familism and
Support for Democracy. Familism is found to be negatively correlated with General Trust, which
confirms Qi's finding that interpersonal trust in East Asian countries tends to undermine general
social trust. This model also confirms the social capital theory, which states that social trust promotes
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democratic governance. The model does not fInd any direct negative correlation between the four
sets of Confucian values and Self-Expression Values. On the contrary, Elitism, Familism and Respect
for Authority are found to contribute to Self-Expression Values. In this model, Preference for
Harmony neither contributes to nor undermines General Trust or Self-Expression Values, but
exhibits a positive correlation with Support for Democracy. The total effects are calculated by adding
the direct effects, association of one variable with another free from other intervening paths, and
indirect effects, association of one variable with another mediated through other variables in the
model. As shown in Table 2, the net effects the four values have on democratic support are all
positive according to this model, with Self-Expression Values affecting Support for Democracy most
signifIcantly.
Familism undermines Support for Democracy by reducing out-group trust, but the net effect
of Familism on Support for Democracy is nonetheless positive. Furthermore, none of the four sets
of Confucian values are found, directly or indirectly, to undermine democratic support at the
individual level.
CONCLUSIONS
No negative correlation between Confucian values and democratic support is found in this
study. On the contrary, a positive correlation, negligible as it is, is presented in the model. Therefore,
this study does not support the claim made in the Clash of Civilizations stating that a major conflict
exists between Confucian values and democracy. With the small path coeffIcients, this study neither
supports the claim that Confucian values could positively contribute to individuals' democratic
support. However, this study refutes cultural arguments against Confucianism regarding
democratization or democratic consolidation.
The constitutional liberties in modern democratic countries, such as freedom of speech and
religion, belong to negative liberty, which designates rights that can be exercised free from
interference. However, the correlativity of rights and duties dictates that rights and duties are just two
sides of a same concept. Confucianism rarely stipulates positive duties people have towards one
another; rather, it mostly enumerates negative duties, which are actions people shall refrain from
doing for the benefIt of others. To say A has a duty not to act in a certain way towards B is the same
as saying that B has a right over A's not acting in that way. TheAnalects says, "Never impose on
others what you would not choose for yourself."l6' If each individual in the society attaches
signifIcant importance to self-autonomy, then everyone else has a duty not to interfere with this
preference as long as it does not do harm to others. Culture is not stagnant, but rather constantly

169
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evolving and opening to new interpretation. Confucianism, it appears, is flexible enough to
accommodate new perspectives.
One cannot simply conclude a particular culture is pro-authoritarian or will foster the gtowth
of democratic ideas. Empirically, no evidence is found that Confucianism is incompatible with
democratic support. Future research should focus on whether institutions established based on
Confucian values or practices inherited from Confucian traditions have played a role in hindering
democratization or democratic consolidation.
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APPENDICES
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NO SMOKING: POLICY DIFFUSION AND ITS PREVAILING FACTORS
Brad Gresik

Abstract· Over the past]eIV years, lIlany states have taken steps to ban sllloking in public areas. The process of
specific polices spreading across state lines is called poliry difjifSion. 5tateJvide anti-indoor sllloking bans are utilized to

demonstrate Ivhat the 1Il0st prevailingfactors ill poliry difjifSioll are. A hvo-step approach to analysis is implellleJIted,
first looking only at simple poliry adoption amongthe 50 states, and secondly the rate at lvNch the poliry expands
across the country. A strongpreseJIce oflocal ordinallces, nearby neighbors lvith statewide bans in effict, and a history of
smokingpreelllptioll laws are found to be the most statistically significant ofa list ofvaJiables. Because difjilsion ofthis
poliry is entering its final stages, this research can be used as a refirencefor designing and implementingpoliry difjilsioll
studies in the future.
INTRODUCTION
Good ideas simply do not materialize as law in every state. Instead, these ideas slowly spread
from state to state based on a variety of internal and external factors, a process called policy
diffusion.

170

The phenomenon of progressive ideas spreading due to specific circumstances has long

been debated by scholars, generally requiring a two-fold examination to understand a policy's
diffusion. First, one must compare the circumstances of states that have adopted or not adopted the
policy in question. Once that is established, it becomes necessary to examine why a policy diffused so
rapidly in some states and lagged in others. The aim of this research is to determine both of these
components in regard to Anti-Indoor Smoking Bans CAISBs).
AISBs are important to the study of policy diffusion because they can be broadly applied as
a model for the study as a whole. This is due to the pressure to pass an AISB coming from different
levels of federalism. In the past, the push has primarily been from local and state pressure, but as of
September2013, federal funding is now being put towards anti-smoking policies. AISBs also
represent a policy which is still diffusing. For example, Indiana passed a comprehensive AISB in July
. 71
of2012, a full 17 years after Utah pioneered the policy in 1995 ' AISBs also are important to
172
examine because they are "fact-based" rather than a "moral-based" policies.
For instance, a state
policymaker can look at same-sex marriage and be morally opposed to it, and in their mindset, have a
reasonable rationale for excluding that policy. Smoking leading to cancer, heart failure, and stroke is
something that is an accepted fact in the majority of U.S., which therefore represents an interesting
take on how a baseline policy can be diffused. Due to these factors, this research can be used as a
jumping off point for other studies in the future and as a point of comparison.
LITERATURE REVIEW
A compelling diffusion analogy once observed that "a sense of political 'Stockholm
Syndrome' exists, where a piece of radical legislation gets passed by the Swedes, then it's flown
directly to the U.S. and is passed into law in California. Then it's flown to Wisconsin. Then to New

170 Shipan

and Volden 2006

171 Americans For Non-Smokers' Rights 2013
172 Shipan and Volden 2006
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York. By the time it gets to Mississippi, which is about four years later, it's a national birthright. 1
This idea of policy diffusion was fIrst widely made popular with Jack L. Walker Jr.'s 1969
groundbreaking work "The Diffusion of Innovations among the American States," which still stands
!74
as a cornerstone of diffusion research.
Walker proposed the idea that the country has several
competitive regional leaders that emulate each other so as not to appear left behind. Using dozens of
different cases, Walker classifIed states as leaders, pioneers, and followers, defIning their role in the
diffusion process while leaving many questions to future scholars. Some of these pivotal questions
include what actually makes a state more or less prone to new ideas, and what is the biggest
determinant of adoption probability.
Virginia Gray began to tackle this problem in the years following Walker's work and began
to better frame the question researchers need to examine. By looking at several different policies
across what V.O. Key called the "have�not spectrum" including education, welfare, and civil rights,
Gray determined that it is almost impossible to fInd a catch-all diffusion model that will inherently
help defIne all future studies. 1

75

Most importantly, she found that all examinations of policy passage

need to be observed as time�specifIc, noting that states can change dramatically in as little as a
decade. Also emphasized was the importance of differing levels of federalism, as policy diffusion
trends looked completely different in cases where, for example, federal influence was exerted rather
than just state and local influence. Finally noted was the importance of current political and
economic conditions of the state during the tirne of passage. For example, a unifIed legislature
combined with a strong current economy might provide incentive to pass a politically turbulent
policy where before it might have been overlooked.
In a direct response to Gray three years later, Robert Eyestone claimed that it would be
irrational to dismiss policy diffusion as a case�specifIc phenomenon and identifIed key trends that
drive policy diffusion. Most importantly, it was found that even when a multitude of different
policies were controlled for, several states were always leaders in early adoption. However, as
Eyestone notes, "Diffusion patterns may record the spread by necessity rather than the emulation of
virtue: leaders may lead because they are also the fIrst to suffer industrial growth which creates
demands for state policy responses.

,,!76

Eyestone summarizes that for policy diffusion to be truly

understood, it must be battered with a multitude of independent variables, as the interactions
between many allow the true result to reveal themselves. The main message is that for diffusion to be
understood, many different models with the same policy must be run. A method which can be

173 Shaw and Renner 2002
174 Jack L.Walker 1973
175 Grey 1973
176 Eyestone 1977
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inferred from these authors suggests examining both simple adoption of a policy and then going
back and surveying the rate at wltich that policy was adopted. Without both parts of the puzzle, the
full story remains obfuscated.
The next major contribution in policy diffusion theory came with Berry and Berry's 1990
diffusion analysis. By using the policy of state lottery adoptions, they determined that many previous
studies had completely ignored the impact of internal factors, such as state legislature and local
municipality makeup, and external factors, such as the number of nearby state powers with similar
policies. The usage of a less controversial topic like lotteries as opposed to something more heated
like gun control also provided future scholars the ability to look at these two different categories as
separate beasts. In a nutshell, Berry and Berry proved to be groundbreaking due to the fact that they
had concrete proof of three principles: "the probability of state innovation is direcdy related to the
motivation to innovate, inversely related to the strength of obstacles, and direcdy related to the
availability of resources for overcoming these obstacles."

m

This not only confIrms that both Virginia

and Gray were correct in their papers, but also gave more context to Walker's fIrst proposal. Due to
the establishment of defInite diffusion facts, Berry and Berry'S article is easily one of the most cited
research endeavors in the fIeld of policy diffusion.
While the evaluation of macro-influences were being gauged and discussed, several scholars
such as John Kingdon and Michael Mintrom took a micro-approach to policy diffusion via the
importance of policy entrepreneurs. Policy entrepreneurs can be defIned as "people who seek to
initiate dynamic policy change.

,,178

In layman's terms, this comes down to individual politicians,

grassroots organizations, and lobbying institutions. Both Kingdon and Mintrom arrive at the
conclusion that policy diffusion absolutely ltinges on the success or failure of these groups in making
l79
their case to legislatures and the public.
Even when controlled across several policies and time, it
was found that effectiveness of policy innovators is statistically signifIcant. Ignoring them would
deprive a study of getting the full scope of what is occurring during the moment of policy
diffusion.

ISO

One interesting method that had not been considered was the notion of examining polices
that do not get adopted and comparing them to those which do. Craig Volden took tltis approach,
and his fIndings were quite strong in reaffIrming many central tenets of policy diffusion. Firsdy, he
noted that polices that do gain national and regional momentum usually have a watershed moment,
during wltich they gain traction and are adopted by many states in a very short period of time. Those

177 Berry and Berry
178 Kingdon 1984
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that do not typically have a very slow start and tend to lead nowhere. When looking at children's
health insurance programs, Volden also found that while diffusion does typically occur regionally
with leaders taking the initiatives fIrst, diffusion occurs most rapidly between states that are located
geographically close while simultaneously having a similar economic and political makeup.

IS!

The most relevant literature in regard to this research paper comes from Shipan and Volden
in 2006.

182

They were the fIrst to attempt to solely look at AISBs and attempt to explain their

diffusion across state lines. This work is signifIcant as it identifIes what makes up an AISB and labels
smoking as a fact-based policy. They also utilized the idea of the watershed moment and were able to
successfully create a working model of policy diffusion incorporating many of the lessons learned by
earlier diffusion scholars. These lessons include incorporating regional importance, policy
entrepreneurs, and several unique models. However, their models missed several key variables, such
as constituent makeup, and they exanrined the policy when it was still very young. To put in
perspective, over 20 states have adopted AISBs since 2006, which indicates that the study completely
missed the rapid watershed phase; in fact, it had only just begun.1

83

HYPOTHESES
My hypotheses for this project reflect the two-stage design explained in the literature review.
My fIrst hypothesis examines strictly policy adoption. The second looks at those states that as of
October 2013 already have policies in place, and assesses the rate in which the policies were passed.
Hi: Having a signifIcant percentage of the population already covered by AISB local ordinances will

lead to a state adopting a comprehensive AISB.
H2a: Geographical closeness to leader states will be the leading cause the rate of AISB to increase.
H2b: Internal state features will be the leading cause of AISB adoptions.

METHODOLGY
This research is based on a combination and adaption of the tests administered by Shipan and
Volden (2006) as well as Berry and Berry (1990). I will examine all 50 states and their adoption of
AISBs between 1995- September 2013. The fIrst module will be a simple Pearson's r to determine if
there is any connection at all between the two dependent variables that will be tested, policy adoption
and rate of adoption. Next a binary logistic regression will be implemented with policy adoption as
the dependent variable. These results will then be compared with the fmal module, which is an
ordinary least squares regression with the rate. I observe rate of adoption in terms of simple years
and do not utilize months, so a policy passed in November 2008 and December of that same year

will receive the same score of 13 years.

18 1 Volden 2006
182 Shipan and Volden 2006
183 Ibid.
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RESEARCH DESIGN
As stated earlier, this research relies on two different dependent variables and the evaluation
of both of them to get the full picture of policy diffusion. My fIrst of these variables, Policy
Adoption, is simply a dummy variable which assigns a 1 to states which have a statewide
comprehensive AISB. Given consideration to the literature and how similar policies can carry the
same theme, a state will be evaluated to have an AISB if they have 2/3 of the parts necessary to have
what is considered a comprehensive smoke-free state: 100 percent smoke-free non-hospitality
184
workplaces, 100 percent smoke-free restaurants, and/or 100 percent smoke-free bars • My second
dependent variable is named Rate of Adoption. The rate of adoption is the number of years that have
!85
passed since the fIrst statewide AISB took place in 1995.
I am counting the years since the fIrst
case, not months. Due to the serious chance of data overlap and inconsistency with several other
independent variables that rely on the date being accurate, I believe simpler is better in this case and
paints a more accurate picture.
One of the most critical intervening variables being analyzed is one which captures the
pressure of local laws and ordinances. Retrieving these data was an arduous task, and was drawn by
adding up the overall percentage of a state's population already covered by local AISBs in place the
day that the statewide comprehensive AISB took effect. A chronological table of state and local
AISB laws

!86

along with a percentage chart of U.S. population covered by 100 percent Smoke-Free

laws were examined, which allowed a Proportion of State Population with Local Restrictions variable
to be generated.

!87

By using multiple data sources, I was able to avoid double counting data for cases

that might have overlapped (like Sacramento versus Sacramento County laws). If a state does not
have an AISB in place, I used the percentage as of October 2013.
The proximity variables were measured by breaking the concept into two parts to capture
the idea of geographical pressure influencing policy diffusion. First, I looked at regional adoption. I
did this by dividing the country into

4 semi-homogeneous partitions based off the Census Bureau's

regional map. The regions used are West (including Hawaii and Alaska), Midwest, South, and
Northeast. I then counted the number of states in that given region that had an AISB in place when
the state being examined passed theirs and divide by the total of regional states minus one to account
for the state itself. This culminates to the production of a Regional Adoption variable. For example,
Florida would receive a .083 because 1/12 of the other southern states already had a comprehensive
AISB in place. I implement a similar scheme for the Bordering State Adoption variable as similarly

184 Americans For Non-S mokers' Rights 2013
185 Ibid.
186 Americans For Non-S mokers' Rights 2013
187 Ibid.
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implemented by Shipan and Volden (2006).1

A state receives this score based on the percentage of

states that share any direct border with the state being examined. This information was collected
from the Americans for Non-Smokers' Rights interest group.
To capture internal state governance similarities, I use a variety of variables. First, I
implement the Legislative Professionalism variable, and use the Squire scale and direcdy place every
state's 2003 legislative professionalism score into SPSS. Legislative professionalism scores are based
on a variety of things, such as how many days the general assembly is in session. The result of this
process is states like California, whose state legislature essentially prepares policymakers for the
national political scene, receive a higher score than places like Idaho, where the legislature is very
speed orientated and lawmakers are more lax. Next I use the Congressional Quarterly Political
Encyclopedia of U.S. States and Regions to look at my Democrat and Republican Unity dummy
variable. For a state to score a 1, the year their AISB was passed both upper and lower house along
with the governor must be from the same party.

ISO

If the state has not passed an AISB, I use October

2013 as the date to record. I also use a dummy variable I call Historical Preemption, again drawing
from the Americans for Non-Smokers' Rights database and give a state a 1 if they have had any kind
of AISB preemption law since 1995, when the fIrst statewide ban took effect until October 2013, the
cutoff date for my model. Finally, I used the variable Government Ideology to capture government
preferences, as opposed to constituent ones, because "all else equal, a more liberal government
,,190
prefers a higher level of government activism.
I use the historical state score from Berry et al.

(2010) to determine the fIgure and use the date of when a state passed an AISB. For those states that
passed statewide AISBs after 2010, I referred to Richard C. Fording's database, which has the
updated fIgures until October 2013. For those states who do not have a statewide AISB, I used the
l91
October 2013 score.
I then turn my attention to the people that comprise the state, and insert several variables
based on their traits. I use Berry et al.'s citizen ideology score to represent the constituents in a
state

ln

I direcdy place this score (from dle year the AISB was placed or October 2013 if none) into

SPSS and named it Citizen Ideology. I also examine historical median income from the US Census
Bureau and use a similar measure of entry into SPPS, again using the dates an AISB was in place (or
l93
October 2013 if none) I call this variable Median Income.

188 Shipan and Volden 2006
189 Winkler 2008

190 Volden 2006
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Tobacco usage and production must also be considered when looking at anything related to
anti-smoking. I used historical smoking rates from when a state passed an AISB or 2013 if AISBs
were not present. I obtained this information from the American Lung Association. I named the
created variable Smoker Percentage. To capture the idea of a tobacco producing state and the
ramifications, I use a dummy variable called Tobacco Producing State, and give a 1 to those states
which grow or produce tobacco products and 0 to those who do not.
Finally I construct two opposite variables which examine lobbyist influence in a state and
name them Tobacco 1.JJbby Percentage and Health 1.JJbby Percentage. The figures are taken from a 1996
snapshot study conducted by Goldstein and Bearman. The measure is "a ratio of the number of
,
health (or tobacco) lobbyists in the state to the total number of registered lobbyists present. ,194
Together I believe these variables accurately reflect the many scholars who wrote diffusion literature
recommend as a "comprehensive analysis of policy diffusion," and truly capture the whole picture of
what is happening in statewide comprehensive anti-indoor smoking bans.
RESULTS
Table 1:

Pearson's r correlation

Policy
Policy & Median income (-.369**)
Policy & South (-.646**)
Policy & Citizen ID (.564**)
Policy & T. Producing State (-.305*)
Policy & Percent Smokers (-.444*)

Years

Years & Percent Region (.689**)
Years & Percent Touch (.439**)
Years & Uni. Republicans (-.351*)
Years & Percent Smokers (.632**)
**-.05 *-.01

Table 1 is the statistically significant Pearson's r correlations between the two dependent
variables in the equation. Between both simple policy adoption and adoption rate, the only common
correlation between the two was Percent Smokers. It has a negative correlation at -.444 and was
statistically significant at the .05 level for policy adoption, meaning more smokers will lead to less of a
chance for an AISB to be in place in that state. For adoption rate, Percent Smokers had a positive
correlation of .632 and was actually significant at the .01 level. Other statistically significant adoption
rate correlations included median income, south, citizen ideology, and if the state is a tobacco
producing one. Adoption rate correlations appeared to be based along geographical lines, with both
my proximity variables of regional adoption and direct border state adoption variables were
statistically significant at the .01 level. To no one's surprise, there was a negative correlation between
unified republicans and the adoption rate of AISBs. Most notably absent from both policy and years
were the variables Unified Democrats and Government Ideology, which in this early test might signal
that in this particular policy, constituent makeup matters more than governmental.

194 Goldstein

and Bearman 1996
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Table 2:

Binary logistic regression of simple policy adoption

Model

Exp(B)

Sig.

Constant

.009

.25

Municipality

.928

.049*

Professionalism

1.03

.679

Unified Republicans

.102

.234

Unified Democrats

6.85

.293

Citizen Ideology

1.215

.015*

Government Ideology

.938

.110

Tobacco Producer

.90

.066

Preemption History

1.470

.836

Median Income

1.056

.593

R2

-

.735

Table 2 represents my first stage of policy diffusion. The dependent variable in this binary
logistic regression was whether or not a state simply had a comprehensive AISB or not. The R2 was
.735, which allows us to say that the model explains 73.5 percent of the variance in the dependent
variable. Of the variables listed above, only the percentage of state covered by local ordinances and
citizen ideology were statistically significant at the .05 level (.049 and .015 respectively).
Professionalism, unified democrats and republicans, government ideology, if the state was a
tobacco producer, preemption of AISBs, and median income were all statistically insignificant. These
initial findings appear to be in line with what other researchers have found to be primary
determinants of policy diffusion but with several key exceptions. All of the factors which represent
state-level influences, such as government ideology and unified legislatures played zero role in
determining the passage of a statewide AISB. The influence of municipality passage also appears to
have diminished since Shipan and Volden's similar endeavor in 2006, which across the board found
.01 significance level, most notably with local ordinances.
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Tahie 3:

T-Score

Sig.

Constant

.992

.333

Municipality

1.072

.296

Percent Region

2.372

.028*

Percent Touching

.377

.71

Professionalism

-1.904

.071

Median Income

-.344

.735

Unified Republican

-.643

.527

Unified Democrat

1.016

.322

South

1.687

.107

Preemption

-2.12

.047*

Citizen Ideology

-.207

.838

Government Ideology

-.274

.787

Tobacco Producer

.864

.398

Percentage Smokers

.869

.395

Tobacco Lobby

-.51

.615

Health Lobby

1.711

.100

Model

R2

-

.765

Std. Error of the Ewmate

-

2.165

Table 3 is the second step in analyzing policy diffusion, this time using rate of adoption with
those states which have an AISB in place as the dependent variable. To calculate this, a filter was
implemented to only look at states that registered policy = 1 on SPSS, resulting in an N of 36. Again,
a high R2 was observed, specifically .765, which gives a high amount of confidence. Surprisingly, this
time the percentage of citizens with a local ordinance and citizen ideology were not statistically
significant. This time municipality had a causal effect of .296 and citizen ideology was observed at
.838. What was statistically significant, however, was the percentage of states already with an AISB in
place when the case state adopted, along with a negative correlation with states that have had a
history of AISB preemption laws in place. Again, unified Democrats and Republicans did not come
up as statistically significant and were observed at .322 and .527 respectively. Surprisingly, the
variables for Tobacco and Health Lobby both were not statistically significant, with the former
coming in at .615 and the latter at .102. Percentage smokers and tobacco being produced in a state
both were also statistically insignificant despite the percentage of state smokers being so strongly
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related in the last model that it had to be removed. The percentage of smokers in a state was only

.395

and production was

.615.

During this step of the evaluation of AISBs, regionalism percentage

and history of preemption laws were statistically sigoificant at the
and preemption

.047. Although

.05

level, with regionalism at

.028

the regionalism score was sigoificant, the bordering score was not.

This is noteworthy because it implies that the defmition of state neighbors must be expanded to
include more than those states which share a direct border.
Figure 1: A frequency table of state adoption rates
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I included this figure to again reaffIrm Volden's hypothesis that a watershed moment exists
where a policy will rapidly diffuse and gain national momentum causing late adopters, or "followers"
l95
such as Wisconsin, to adopt a specific policy.
was an explosion of diffusion that as of

2005-2009 appears to be that time period, as there

2013 has appeared to have completely

dissipated. Finally, it

can be inferred through this observation that the states that have not yet adopted (the majority of
them being in the south) will never do so given the current influencers both inside and around their
state.
CONCLUSION
My initial hypotheses for my two-step approach to policy diffusion were only partially
conHrmed. For simple policy adoption, having a larger percentage of people already covered by local
ordinances was statistically sigoiHcant, but that was only when coupled with several other distinct
variables. As mentioned above, placing the variable of historical smoker population percentages
completely skewed the results. On top of that, the sigoiHcance level was only

.049. If any other

southern state were to adopt a comprehensive AISB, I imagine that local pressure would no longer
become statistically sigoiHcant. I was also incorrect about having a multitude of underlying state

195 Volden 2006
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features affecting adoption. All of my other variables attempting to control for government
preference and capacity fell flat. I do know however (due to my Pearson's r correlation) that there is a
lot more going on with adoption of AISBs, as median income, being a southern state, and citizen
ideology all were significant at the

.01 level. Perhaps future researchers can construct more focused

regressions to figure out what I am missing and account for the lost variables.
My evaluation of statewide AISB adoption rates yielded similar contradictions with my
hypotheses and data. I was correct in my estimate that geographical proximity would play a key patt
in determining policy diffusion, but I expected a state sharing a direct border with an AISB state
would be more significant than regionalism percentage. The opposite actually occurred, with
regionalism having a significance rate of

.028 and sharing a direct border only being .71. Again it

appeared that state legislature makeup had no effect on policy diffusion at the state level. The only
other factor that was actually significant at the

.05 level was having a history of AISB

preemption,

which therefore likely threw off the municipality numbers because it was illegal for local governments
to have them. Based on my Pearson's r correlation between adoption rates and percentage of a state's
smoking population being

.632, I strongly expected that result to shine through in my OLS

regression. Seeing another lost variable, I ran another regression with just variables significant at the

.1 level and nothing carne back as statistically significant. This therefore reaffirmed Berry and Berry's
1990

conclusion that for policy diffusion to be analyzed, there needs to be a multitude of

independent variables. Comparing the two independent variables' results show that many different
forces are at play when polices diffuse, and ignoring a two-step procedure leaves out much of the
story.
According to my frequency chart, policy diffusion for statewide comprehensive anti-indoor
smoking bans appears to be at its end. Unfortunately for this study, federal influence on this policy
did not begin until September

2013,

with a national ad campaign from the Center for Disease

,,!96
Control (CDC) aimed at curbing tobacco usage called "Tips from Former Smokers.
The full
impact of this new federal initiative has not been recorded on states that do not have a
comprehensive AISB and it is likely that it might tip the scale toward adopting legislation. This
research can therefore be interpreted as the result of state and local government, as the diffusion is
appears to be largely completed. In the coming months when such federal spending can be coded,
future researchers can use this document to provide insight on how to explain policy diffusion.

196

Center for Disease Control and Prevention 2013

RE S PUB Lie A 187

REFERENCES
Americans For Non-Smokers' Rights. "Smokefree Lists, Maps and Data." 2013. http://www.no
smoke.org/goingsmokefree.php?id=519 on: [December 2,2013]
Americans For Non-Smokers' Rights. "Chronological list." 2013,http://www.no
smoke.org/pdf/EffectivePopulationList.pdf on: [December 2,2013]
Americans For Non-Smokers' Rights "WRB Laws map." 2013 http://www.no
smoke.org/pdf/WRBLawsMap.pdf on: [December 2,2013]
Berry, Frances and William D.Stokes Berry. 1990. "State Lottery Adoptions as Policy Innovations:
An Event History Analysism." American Political Science Review 84 Gune) (2): 395-415.
Boehmke, Fredrick. 2005. Tbe Indirect Effect ofDimt Legislation: HolV Institlltions Sbape Interest Grorrp
Systellls. Columbus: The Ohio State University Press.
Eyestone, Robert. 1977. "Confusion, Diffusion, and Innovation." A1JJcn"can Political Scimee RevieJvJ
104 (1) Gun.): 443.
Fording, Richard C. 2013. "State Ideology Data." http://rcfording.wordpress.com/state-ideology
datal on: [December 2,2013]
Goldstein, Adam O. and Nathan S Bearman. 1996. "State Tobacco Lobbyists and Organizations in
the United States: Crossed Lines." AnJelican jorr17lal ofPtlblic Healtll 86 (8): 1137-42.
Gray, Virginia 1973. "Innovation in the States: A Diffusion Study." AllJerican Political Science Revinv, 67
(Dec.) (4): 1173-1187
Kingdon, John W. 1984. Agendas Alternatives, and Ptlblic Policies. Boston: Little Brown and
Company.
Markel, Donald P Haider. 2008. Political Enryclopedia of U.S. States and Regions Ubrary
jotlmal Washington: CQ Press.
lvlintrom, Michael. 1997 "Policy Entrepreneurs and the Diffusion of Innovation." AlmriCCIn jO"'71al of
Politiccrl Science 41 Gan.) (3) :738-770.
Mintrom, Michael el al. 1997. "The State-Local Nexus in Policy Innovation Diffusion: The Case of
School Choice." Prrblitls: Tile jotlmal ofFederalis1ll27 (Sept.) (3) :41-59.
Shaw, Greg and Tari Renner. "Patterns of State Policy Diffusion: Convoys, Packs and Clusters."
MWPSA 4/2002.
Shipan, Charles R and Craig Volden. 2006. "Bottom-Up Federalism: The Diffusion of Anti-Smoking
Policies from U.S. Cities to States." American jormral ofPolitical Science 55 (Oct.) (4): 825-842.
Tips from Fromer Smokers. Center for Disease Control. 2013
http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/campaign/tips/resources/videos/ on: [December 2,2013]
US Census Bureau 2013. "Historical Income Tables."
.census.gov/hhes/www/income/data/historical/household. on: [December 2, 2013]

www

88 IRE S PUB LIe A

Volden, Craig. "States as Policy Laboratories: Emulating Success in the Children's Health Insurance
Program." AIJJelicCIII Jotlmal
Walker,Jack L. "Problems

Scieflce Revielll, 67

ofPolitica! Science 50 (Apr.) (2) (2006): 294-312.

in Research on Diffusion of Policy Innovations." A"Jelican Political

(Dec.)

(4): 1186-91.

RES

PUBLIe A 1"89

CURIOSITY OR MANNERS:
THE VALUES THAT SHAPE AMERICAN POLITICAL MINDSETS
Ryan Winter

Abstract: In the late 1990s, political analyst and lingnist George Lakoffproposed an intrigning new IVqy to

nnderstand what sepamtes liberalsfrom cOllseroatives in A111C1ican politics. His theory Ivas based on the prenlise that
there are I1vo opposingfra111es thlvtlgh Ivhich Americans vielv politics, alld that parentillg vallies deter111ine Ivhichfra111e
one chooses. Those Ivho adhere to the strictfather mode! hold consemative belieft on a Ivide range ofisslles, Ivhile
11fotnmnt parents are more liberaL Lakoffs Ivritings have sillce become Ividespread alld his parenting theory has
cOllvillced mallY political strategists and activists, despite thefact that his hypotheses lacked empirical evidence. This
st1lqy 1Ised Stllvry data to test the ittspact ofpmmtillg valt/es 011 a wide range ofcontroversial policies. Itfinds strollg
s1lpp011for the hypotheses that smct fathers tend to prefor stronger securi!y measures and stfPP011 tmditiollal social
norms, 1vhile t1tlrlllrtltll parmls are more h'beral on these isslles. HOJJJever, parenting style proved to be a poor indicator
ofpolitical affit1ldes on the govemmC1lt's role ill the eCOIl011I)1.
INTRODUCTION
On September 20th of 2004, millions of Americans turned on their teb�sions to watch the
first presidential debate between George W. Bush and John Kerry. On issues ranging from foreign
policy to social problems to financial matters, the candidates clashed at every turn. Then, during one
of Kerry's responses, Bush made a very strange comment. It was such a small, unremarkable moment
that most people have now forgotten it. However, if one were to believe the writings of cognitive
scientist George Lakoff, Bush's remark and Kerry's response perfectly explains the vast differences
between two men representing political polar opposites.
John Kerry was in the middle of complimenting the president and his family on how well
they handled the considerable pressure of living in the White House. Kerry began to joke about the
Bush daughters, "I've chuckled a few times at some of their comments/' but Bush interrupted. " I'm
trying to put a leash on them," he said, to which Kerry immediately replied, "Well I don't know, I've
learned not to do that." The audience laughed appreciatively for both candidates, and the debate
continued. While this brief interchange might appear no more than a slight disagreement in parenting
techniques, Lakoff believes it is the ultimate key to understanding why some people are liberals and
others are conservatives.
LAKOFF'STHEORY
It was during the 1990s that Lakoff began to wonder where people got their political
attitudes from. Specifically, he was interested in why the two dominant political ideologies in America
stood opposed on so many seemingly unrelated issues. " The question I asked myself," he recalls,
"was this: What do the conservatives' positions on issues have to do with each other?"197 What does
being against gun control have to do with opposing gay marriage? Why should a person's opinions
on foreign policy correspond to a particular stance on tile environment, and what does abortion have

197 Lakoff 2004
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to do with welfare spending? Is there some natural connection that explains the organization of these
beliefs, or are they just historical remnants of coalition building?!98 These questions had been asked
before, but Lakoff's answer was a completely new one that captured the imagination of his readers.
In his earlier work, Lakoff argued that people construct political opinions on the basis of their moral
identity.!99 For example, if one were to ask the average American to explain why abortion should be
legal or illegal, they might give facts and figures to back up their position, but in the end it comes
down to wbat feels right, a fundamental and unchangeable belief that abortion is either morally
acceptable or unacceptable. There are two opposing frames through which Americans view the world
of politics, Lakoff says. One frame is associated with liberal beliefs and the other with conservative.
One missing piece remained in his theory: Lakoff had not yet explained the logic holding these
frames together.
It is obvious that liberals and conservatives view the world differendy; the real question is
why. The incessant use of the phrase "family values" by conservative politicians first gave Lakoff the
idea that perhaps the two opposing political frames in this country result from two opposing
conceptions of the family. Because families occupy such a core part of life, it seems reasonable to
infer that parenting values could function as a heuristic for more complex issues, including politics.
His hypothesis, as another team of researchers succinctly summarized, was that "As people
normatively understand proper relations between parents and children, so will they envision proper
relations between government and its citizens."200 Consequently, the two frames underlying political
identity correspond to two different styles of parenting: on the one hand the nurturant parent, and
on the other the strict father.2°1

The Strict Father
The strict father mentality is one that most people will recognize immediately. It starts with
the assumption that humans are naturally flawed and want to do what feels good, not what is right.
Children must to be taught right from wrong by a loving but stern authority figure-the father. The
world is competitive, but those who work hard and stand by their morals will rise to the top.202
Children must be corrected if they disobey their parents or resist learning discipline. Often, they must
be spanked for their own good, because punishment will keep them from making mistakes again. For
strict fathers, all kinds of social ills and perversions can be attributed to permissive parenting
practices. They believe that those who deviate from traditional lifestyles, commit violent crime, or
19 8
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Both men and women can technically be "strict father" types, as long as they agree with its overall outlook.

In fact, this study finds that women are actually slightly more likely than men to identify with the strict father
model.
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rely on government assistance were never disciplined as children and never learned to be responsible
adults.203
The political implications of such a mindset follow logically. Strict parents oppose taxing big
business and wealthy business owners because they are doing their part and contributing to the
economy. Government "handouts" and other programs that promote equality only encourage
laziness and do not teach people responsibility. Lakoff argues that the strict parent's focus on
punishment as a correctional measure, along with the belief in absolute good and evil, explains why
conservatives insist on a tough stance on crime and a strong military.204

The Nlllillrant Parent
Nurturant parents take a more interdependent view of the world, valuing egalitarianism and
tolerance of other moral standards. While the strict father model presupposes a traditional family, the
nurturant parent is gender-neutral and can be found in a traditional family, a single-parent family, or
even same-sex relationships.2os If there are two parents, they share the responsibility of raising and
disciplining the child, which they believe is born good and can be made better through nurturance.
The utmost goal is for the child to live a happy, fulfilled life so that it can grow up to nurture others
and make the world a better place. Lakoff thinks that parents who fall closer to the nurturant end of
the spectrum are more likely to have the values of tolerance and empathy accessible when they think
about politics.2OO If he is right in guessing that nurturance underlies American liberalism, it would
certainly explain much of the Democraric Party's current platform, including universal healthcare,
raising the minimum wage, workers' rights, and more. On issues from gay marriage to social policy to
foreign policy, the nurturant parent oudook leads logically to the opposite conclusions of the strict
father.

Implications
If Lakoff's theory is correct, it could have enormously significant consequences for
politicians, campaigns, and researchers. Lakoff suggests that partisans can use parenting metaphors to
harness the potential of undecided and independent voters, by far the most vital slice of the
electorate. Since nonpartisans do not use one of the two parenting models but rather a mix
depending on the situation, Lakoff argues that candidates of either party can activate the middle
through careful word choice and by framing the political debate in ways that remind voters of their
parenting values.207 Apart from influencing elections and public opinion, Lakoff's model could be a

203 Lakoff 1996, 197
204 Lakoff 2004
205 Ibid.
206 Ibid.
207 Lakoff 2004

92 IRE S PUBLie A

very useful tool for political scientists. If he is right, it would be possible to predict people's feelings
on a wide range of political issues simply by asking them a few questions about parenting.
While his insights certainly contributed a creative new take on the origins of ideological
constraint, Lakoffs model lacked systematic data to back it up. He relied primarily on the face-value
plausibility of his parenting theory, without offering scientific evidence. Therefore, a study testing the
reliability of the parenting theory provides much-needed quantitative research on a topic that could
have major repercussions for the ways political scientists think about ideological constraint.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Other researchers have designed experiments to test the parenting proposal, but for the
most part these have been contradictory or inconclusive. Analyses of survey data from 2000 revealed
that "the stronger one's views regarding childrearing-either in terms of nurturance or disdpline
the more consistently liberal or conservative one's political attitudes tend to be,"2o, a finding that
offers robust support to Lakoffs claims. Archival research, too, has revealed a correlation between
statewide attitudes towards punishing children and presidential vote. As a general rule, red states
approve of corporal punishment while blue states do not. In their book AlltboritarianisJJI and

Poimization in American Politics, Heatherington and Weiler describe a positive relationship between the
percentage of a state's population that voted for Bush in 2004 and the share of parents who
approved of using physical punishment to discipline children. At the top were Idaho, Wyoming, and
Oklahoma, all of which voted nearly seventy percent for Bush, and where about sixty percent of
parents approved of using physical punishment. At the other end were Massachusetts, Vermont,
Rhode Island, and New York, with the lowest rates of Bush voters and corporal punishment.2OO
While useful for highlighting trends, this type of data can only show correlations, not underlying
causes. Heatherington and Welier cannot conclude from these data that parenting attitudes canse
worldviews. It might be that some other variable causes both strict parenting and Republican voting.
The correlation between the two could well be spurious. Nonetheless, these statewide trends
certainly bolster the authority of Lakoffs model.
Other researchers are more hesitant to accept the parenting hypothesis. In one creative
experiment, linguist Alan Cienki studied presidential candidates' use of strict or nurturant expressions
in presidential debates. He concluded that Al Gore was more likely to use nurturant language or
gestures than George W. Bush, but the overall occurrence of such metaphors was extremely low. If
parenting indeed represents the underlying frame through which all of politics is understood, it
should have shown up more frequently in these important political talks. Another researcher testing

208 Barker and Tinnick 2006
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Lakoffs conclusions stopped short of ever testing for ideological constraint.210 Postlewait interpreted
Lakoffs writing to mean that there should be two distinct camps of parents, with few people
remaining in the middle. When she discovered that in reality parenting styles more closely resembled
a normal distribution, she concluded that the results did not fit with Lakoffs depiction of two
"radically opposed" styles.2!1 However, Lakoff does not claim that that all people are either one type
of parent or the other. In fact, he says there is a range of parenting styles and that the majority of
people alternate between strict and nurturant styles depending on the situation. For these reasons,
Postlewait's conclusion was shortsighted. Liberals and conservatives make up only a small portion of
the population, so why should parenting purists be the majority? In fact, the finding that most
parents fall in between strictness and nurturance only increases the importance for politicians to
understand these frames. A liberal candidate running for office will have already locked down the
vote of nurturant parents, but needs to figure out how to speak to and convince the swing voters in
the middle, who use both frames and respond to both. This is where the political battle takes place,
so understanding how to connect with these voters is essential.
HYPOTHESES
For the purpose of testing, Lakoffs theory has been broken into two smaller hypotheses. To
pass the initial test of validity, the independent variable of parenting style must accurately predict
broad political attitudes, such as party identification, ideology, and presidential vote. If it cannot, then
Lakoff will have a hard time convincing others of his theory's reliability.

Hl: Strict fathers will be more likely than nurturant parents to identify as
Republicans, to identify as conservatives, and to vote for Romney in 2012.
Later on, more focused hypotheses will test parenting style's relationship towards specific policies,
but the foundation of Lakoffs theory rests on the assumption that people instinctively access their
parenting values to interpret the political world. If nurturant parents are no more likely than strict
fathers to call themselves Democrats or Republicans, conservatives or liberals, then Lakoffs theory
will have been dealt a fatal blow and it will hardly be worthwhile to continue the study.
After testing for broad political identities, I proceed to test Lakoffs assertion that parenting
styles tie together the diverse coalition of ideas that comprise liberal and conservative worIdviews.
Again, my independent variable was parenting style and I tested for sixteen different dependent
variables on as many controversial political topics as possible. Studying these attitudes separately will
enable comparison of which types of political views, if any, parenting can predict. For ease of
interpretation these sixteen issues have been categorized into three groups: security, traditional
values, and desire for equality.
210 Postlewait 2006
211 Lakoff 1996, 35
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H2a: Strict fathers will show more support than nurturant parents for defense and
security issues.
Because strict fathers view the world as a dark and dangerous place, they are expected to favor
vigorous law enforcement and a strong military. It also seems logical to expect that strict father types
would be less trusting of others in general. Nurturant parents decidedly disagree. Five political
attitudes dealing with security were measured, including federal defense spending, crime spending,
the death penalty, gun control, and social trust.

H2b: Strict fathers will be more likely to approve of traditional family roles and
socially conservative values than nurturant parents.
Recall that nurturant parents teach their children to be more tolerant and accepting of diversity,
whereas strict fathers are likely to think that others should live by traditional roles and the customs of
their own parents. Again, five attitudes-feelings about abortion, gay marriage, traditional gender
roles, environmental protection, and white privilege-were tested to determine the influence of
parenting. Lakoffs theory will only be strengthened if nurturant parents choose the more tolerant or
liberal option.
The last group of issues dealt with the role and scope of the government and the extent to
which it should be involved in promoting equality. Naturally, strict parents are expected to prefer a
small government, allowing those who have learned discipline to flourish without interference.
Nurturant parents, however, see the welfare state as essential to helping people back on their feet so
they can become self-sufficient and give back to a society that cares for its citizens.

H1c: Nurturant parents will be more likely than strict fathers to endorse
government intervention to promote equaliry.
Altogether, six attitudes were measured that correspond to views on equality, including feelings about
government involvement in the economy, universal healthcare, welfare spending, size of government,
affirmative action, and a general measure of the importance of having an equal society.
If parenting philosophy fails to consistently predict views on all of these topics, or if it only
predicts views on one or two out of the three categories, then I have failed to fmd support for
Lakoffs theory. If, after controlling for extraneous variables, parenting remains a strong predictor of
all these political views, then substantial support will be given to the parenting theory put forward by
Lakoff, lending a more systematic form of credibility to his anecdotal evidence
DESIGN AND MEASUREMENT

Operationalization of Variables
For all the necessary variables and controls in this study, data was drawn from the most
recent American National Election Study CANES), conducted at the time of the 2012 election. To
operationalize the chief independent variable, parenting style, four questions were chosen from the
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dataset that directly measured the nurturant/ strict cleavage. For each question, respondents were
offered two possible traits, one nurturant and one strict, and were asked to choose which they
considered preferable for children have. The choices included "independence or respect for elders";
"curiosity or good manners"; "obedience or self-reliance"; and "considerate or well-behaved."
Nurturant responses received zeroes and strict responses ones. The resulting scale, which is labeled
in the data as "parent score," ran from zero to fOUf, with higher scores indicating a stricter parenting
style. Unfortunately, the ANES 2012 did not ask for respondents' opinions on the use of corporal
punishment to discipline children, one of Lakoffs major distinctions between the two styles. Despite
this omission, the parent score should provide a very good measure of the two frames Lakoff
described. As Table 1 illustrates, the questions did not intercorrelate as highly as might be expected.
However, Lakoff predicted most people to fall somewhere in the middle of the scale because most
people are not strong liberals or conservatives and would therefore employ both models in everyday
life. Each individual question correlated highly with the scale as a whole, and the removal of any
single question did not significantly alter the findings of this research. The most common score was a
three out of fouf, meaning the average American is more strict than nurturant, a result consistent
with other studies of authoritarianism among the American population.212
1
·
Matnx 0fParentm Index andInd·lV1·du alP arentlng Questlons
Tabie 1: CorreIatIOn

Independence/

Independence/

Curiosity/

Obedience/

Considerate/

Respect Elders

Manners

Self-Reliance

Well-Behaved

1

Respect Elders
Curiosity/

.331**

1

.326**

.350**

1

. 133**

.282**

.264**

1

.624**

.716**

.729**

.641 **

Manners
Obedience/
Self-Reliance
Considerate/
Well-Behaved
Parent Score

Note: One asterIsk denotes slgruficance at the .05 level, two asterIsks at the .001 level

ANES data were also used to measure the dependent variables. The survey included
questions that dealt with all sLxteen issues mentioned in the hypotheses, as well as sociodemographics
and other extraneous variables for which social scientists routinely contro1.213 Because race has well
known effects on American political identity, and because some of the dependent vatiables such as

212 Heatherington and Weiler 2009
213 These included age (measured by group), gender (men were coded as zeroes, women as ones; therefore a
positive relationship with "gender" actually indicates that females were likely to hold that particular attitude),
education level (five categories were included, and a higher score indicated more years of education), and
annual income (measured in 28 categories ranging from under $5000 to over $250,000, a higher score indicates
a higher annual income).
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affirmative action and white privilege dealt directly with radal issues, two dummy variables, white and
black, controlled for race. Religion has also been shown to correlate with political beliefs, notably
abortion and gay marriage, so a scale that combined two dimensions of religious behavior was
created. Frequency of attendance at religious services and frequency of private religious practice were
combined into an overall religiosity score. Last, party identification was measured in the form of a
seven-point scale from strong Democrat to strong Republican, and another seven-point scale
measured ideological self-placement from strong liberal to strong conservative. On both of these two
indicators, the more right-wing answers were coded as higher. It should be noted that party ID and
ideology were almost always controls and were therefore categorized as independent variables.
However, hypothesis one required testing of these as dependent variables. When party ID was a
dependent variable, ideology was still controlled for and vice versa.

Testing the Relationships
Each dependent variable was tested separately. For most of these, ordinary least squares
regression was employed to determine the relative strengrh of parenting and all of the other
sododemographic and control variables. However, three of the dependent variables only had two
possible outcomes. For vote for president, size of government, and role of government in the
economy, binary logistic regression was used instead of OLS.214 The results of the regression models
allow us to see which factors are significant predictors for each of the nineteen separate dependent
variables. When the parenting index receives a high T-score that means it is a good independent
predictor of people's views towards that issue.

21 4

For size of government, respondents were asked to choose from "the less government, the better," or

"there are more things that government should be doing." For government's role in the economy, respondents
were read: "One, we need a strong government to handle today's complex economic problems; or two, the free
market can handle these problems without government being involved."

RES

PUBLIe A 197

RESULTS

Table 2: Political Identities
Party ID

Presidential Vote

Ideology

(binary)
Beta

T

Beta

T

Parenting Score

.002

.164

.120

9.734**

1.159*

Age

-.050

-4.563**

.061

5.370**

1.037

Gender

-.041

-3.697**

-.030

-2.614*

1.138

Education

.044

3.563**

-.044

-3.463**

.912

Income

.052

4.326**

.004

.314

1.015

Party ID

--

--

.606

48.958**

2.563**

Ideology

.574

48.958**

-

--

2.339**

Religiosity

.048

4.024**

.137

11.301**

1.083*

White

.103

5.950**

.002

.094

1.664

Black

-.183

-10.588**

.019

1.054

.055**

--

-.955

--

10.717

.000

C onstant
R Square

-

.477

.448

Exp

(B)

.799 (Nagelkerke R
Square)

Note: One astensk denotes slgruficance at the .05 level, two astensks at the .0011evel
The higher the T-score, the stronger the predictive power of that variable. A negative T-scorc indicates a
negative causal influence of that variable on the political attitude.
An Exp (B) that exceeds one denotes a positive relationship, while less than one denotes a negative
relationship.

As Lakoff predicted, nurturant parents were much more likely to self-identify as liberal, even
after controlling for party ID and other variables, while strict fathers were more often conservative.
This relationship is statistically significant at the .001 level, and in fact proved to be one of the best
predictors of how people defined their ideology, surpassing education, income, gender, and age. In
fact, only party ID and religiosity showed stronger predictive power. However, looking as an
independent predictor of party ID, parenting performed much worse than it did for ideology. This
finding should not be mistaken as an assertion that nurturant parents are unlikely to be Democrats,
because bivariate correlations show that they are. Instead, the regression model reveals that nurturant
attitudes do not cause people to become Democrats. The variance in partisanship is instead explained
by other factors, notably ideology and race.
Finally, the parenting effect was tested for presidential vote. Here, the relationship is small
but significant at the .05 level. Even after holding party ID, ideology, and all other contaminating
variables constant, nurturant parents were significantly more likely to cast a ballot for Obama than
strict parents, who favored Romney. Despite the immense amount of attention focused on the
notorious gender gap and the media's coverage of Romney's personal wealth, gender and income
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were still eclipsed by the predictive power of parenting. At the theoretical level it appears that Lakoff
was on to something, but examining the issues in closer detail will reveal the true influence of
parenting on today's most controversial political debates.

H)pothesis 2a: 5eemity

TahIe 3: S eCU!1ty
Defense

Crime Spending

DeathPenalty

Social Trust

Gun Control

Spending
Beta

T

Beta

T

Beta

T

Beta

T

Beta

T

Parentin
g Score

.104

6.479**

.156

9.595**

.177

11.336**

.001

.041

-.139

-8.993**

Age

.070

4.834**

.046

3.107*

.014

1.002

.061

4.346**

.083

5.914**

Gender

.019

1.329

.047

3.150*

-.031

-2.158*

.149

10.665**

-.007

-.494

-.066 1-3.979**

-.062

-3.915**

.043

2.751*

.144

9.122**

-.101

-6.233**

Income

.003

.219

-.029

-1.829

.040

2.570*

.028

1.821

.119

7.798**

Party ID

.167

8.356**

-.078

-3.887**

.155

8.052**

-.248

-13.125**

.060

3.150*

Ideology

.212

10.864**

-.013

-.671

.138

7.403**

-.138

-7.500**

-.025

-1.376

Religiosity

.016

.995

.039

2.433*

-.159

-10.348**

.012

.786

.056

3.667**

White

-.022

-.987

-.043

-1.858

.057

2.549*

-.064

-2.896*

.098

4.446**

Black

.019

.851

.022

.927

-.039

-1.737

-.018

-.834

-.074

-3.294**

--

10.402

--

35.748

--

9.286

--

25.406

--

23.913

Educatio
n

Constant
R Square

.169

.069

.144

.163

Note: One asterlsk denotes slgruficance at the .05 level, two asterIsks at the .001 level
The higher the T-score, the stronger the predictive power of that variable. A negative T-score indicates a
negative causal influence of that variable on the political attitude.

The regression results for predicting distrust of others and the related desire for increased
security were astounding. As indicated in Table 3, parenting emerged as one of the strongest, if not
the best, predictor of attitudes on nearly every issue. Often, parenting's independent effect even
surpassed the giants of party ID and ideology. Strict parents heavily favored increasing the defense
budget; in fact, only party ID and ideology better predicted views towards defense spending.
Parenting index actually proved to be the strongest predictor of views on the death penalty and crime
spending, an extremely promising result for Lakoff, and after education, parenting proved to be the
best predictor for social trust. The one exception was gun control, where parenting had almost no
effect at all. One possible response to this anomaly is that for gun control, either side could
technically be viewed as a security issue. For some people, gun access is vital to protecting their
family from a hostile world. For others, there are many evil people in this hostile world who should
not be able to get their hands on a gun. And yet most Americans recognize that there is a clear
conservative and liberal side to the issue of gun control. Either Lakoffs model must be elaborated to

.150

RE S PUBLICA 1�99

explain this discrepancy, or it must acknowledge that it simply cannot predict attitudes towards gun
resrrictions.2l5 Overall, these results substantially srrengthen Lakoffs hypothesis; strict parents
trusted others less and were willing to spend more to ensure their security.

Hypothesis 2b: Traditiollal Sodal Vallies

Table 4' Traditional Social Issues
Gay Marriage

Abortion

Gender Roles

WhitePrivilege

Environment

Beta

T

Beta

T

Beta

T

Beta

T

Beta

T

Parenting
Score

-.158

11.476**

-.111

-8.074**

.112

7.115**

-.042

-2.852*

.199

13.550**

Age

�.091

-7.246**

.039

3.130*

.121

8.411**

-.052

-3.933**

-.054

-4.013**

Gender

.073

5.850**

.055

4.359**

-.062

-4.323**

.026

1.932

-.043

-3.190**

Education

.078

5.597**

.066

4.696**

-.079

-4.938**

-.007

-.464

-.169

-

Income

.000

-.010

.049

3.627**

.023

1.466

-.045

-3.156*

-.023

-1.558

Party ID

-.148

-8.760**

-.122

-7.234**

.046

2.381*

-.256

-

.151

8.363**

.165

9.401**

11.366**

14.281**
Ideology

-.215

Religiosity

-.277

-

-.227

13.024**
-

-

.137

7.215**

-.257

.119

7.603**

.014

.979

-.039

-2.717*

13.791**
-.348

20.414**

-

14.784**

25.625**

White

.060

3.064*

.000

.023

-.018

-.792

-.044

-2.124*

.000

-.021

Black

-.018

-.895

.088

4.453**

-.043

-1.874

.006

.279

-.194

-9.180**

--

39.928

--

26.643

--

9.631

--

51.265

--

14.895

Constant
R Square

.330

.333

.117

.250

.238

Lakoffs model was again srrongly supported on attirudes ranging from abortion to white
privilege. Table 4 exhibits the absolutely immense influence of parenting style on acceptance of gays
and lesbians. For homosexual marriage, parenting style surpassed age and even party ID; only
religiosity and ideology performed better on this issue. On abortion, the T-score of over eight shows
a high association between nurturance and pro-choice attitudes, and once again the only better
predictors were religiosity and ideology. When asked whether it would harm the family for a woman
to work outside of the home, strict fathers showed startlingly high preferences for rraditional gender
roles. While environmental issues may not have revealed the same level of predictive power as other
issues, here too Lakoffs hypothesis was supported. It appears that nurturant artitudes towards
children rranslate into environmental protection, a finding statistically significant at the .05 level.
Where parenting style really stood out was on measures of white privilege, or the ability of
members of the majority race to ignore historical and institutional prejudices that maintain racial
215 Interestingly, gun control was the only security issue where gender played such a major role. Women were
much more likely to think it should be more difficult to buy a gun.
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inequality. This variable was measured by asking respondents how strongly they agreed or disagreed
with the statement, "It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only
try harder they could be just as well off as whites." After controlling for a multitude of intervening
variables, parenting stood out as the most significant variable measured, with a T-score of over
thirteen. For white privilege, parenting is more important than whether one is black or white.
Education represents the second strongest individual predictor, with increases in education resulting
in drastically reduced white privilege. Returning to Lakoffs theory, we can observe that it is clearly
borne out on all social issues measured.

Hypothesis 2c: Eql/ality

Table 5: Independence versus Interdependence (OLS Reg ession)
Equality

Healthcare

Welfare

Afftrmative Action

Beta

T

Beta

T

Beta

T

Beta

T

Parenting
Score

-.084

-5.667**

-.042

-3.392**

-.067

-4.573**

-.096

-6.250**

Age

-.009

-.683

.001

.107

-.002

-.140

.003

.211

Gender

.001

.063

.020

1.755

.023

1.692

-.016

-1.179

Education

.045

3.023*

.035

2.787*

-.053

-3.538**

.064

4.093**

Income

-.003

-.179

.023

1.914

-.161

-11.118**

-.044

-2.885*

Party ID

-.180

-9.919**

-.446

-29.462**

-.203

-11.310**

-.240

-12.755**

Ideology

-.265

-15.002**

-.253

-17.182**

-.231

-13.192**

-.151

-8.233**

Religiosity

.009

.635

.020

1.637

.041

2.864*

.070

4.632**

White

-.033

-1.569

-.042

-2.376*

-.036

-1.740

-.012

-.554

Black

.104

4.880**

.080

4.511**

.073

3.481**

.241

10.829**

--

32.112

--

33.540

-

47.052

--

21.979

Constant
R Square

.226

Note: One astensk denotes slgruficance at the

.467

-

.244

.05 level, two astensks at the .001

.262

level.

The higher the T-score, the stronger the predictive power of that variable. A negative T-score indicates a
negative causal influence of that variable on the political attitude.
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Table 6: Independence versus Interdependence :Binary Logistic Regression)
Big Government

Free Market

Exp (B)

Exp (B)

Parenting Score

1.097*

.952

Age

.959**

1.000

Gender

1.316**

.711**

.913*

1.056

Income

.983**

.993

Party ID

.696**

1.453**

Ideology

.704**

1.505**

Religiosity

1.035*

.960*

White

.675*

1.362 *

Black

1.524*

.612

Constant

12.115

.054

.366

.371

Education

Nagelkerke R
Square

Note: One astensk denotes sIgruficance at the

.05 level, two asterIsks at the .001

level

An Exp (B) that exceeds one denotes a positive relationship, while less than one denotes a negative

relationship.

On the third set of issues, which can be seen on Tables 5 and 6, parenting style showed
mixed results, and in general the impact of parenting on policy preference was weaker than for
hypotheses 2a and 2b. Still, it remained a statistically significant predictor for some
independent/interdependent issues. For the variable classified "equality," respondents were asked
whed1er the country would be better off if we worried less about how equal people are. As predicted
by Lakoffs model, nurturant parents turned out to be more concerned about fairness. This
relationship proved to be statistically significant at the .001 level, and only party ID and ideology
proved to be stronger predictors. Nurturant parents were also significandy more likely than strict
fathers to support the Affordable Care Act, affirmative action, and welfare spending, findings
consistent with Lakoffs predictions. While most of Hypothesis 2c's dependent variables had lower
T-scores than security and traditional social issues, many remained statistically significant at the .001
level, so while the relationship is perhaps weaker than Lakoff predicted it is certainly present.
However, parenting theory fails to explain attitudes on government involvement in the
economy and views on the proper size of government.2lG Lakoff would have predicted nurturant
parents to advocate more government involvement to help solve society's inequalities, while strict
fathers are supposed to distrust government and want it to do less. However, Table 6 shows that

216

These two issues required binary logistic regression because respondents were only offered two choices.

They were entered into a different table for this reason, and their Wald scores should not be compared to T
scores in OLS. It was a mere coincidence that the two measures that did not support Lakoffs hypothesis were
the two that required binary logistic regression.
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while conservatives, Republicans, and men were more likely to endorse laissez-faire government,
parenting had no significant effect. For size of government, there is a significant parenting effect, but
it goes in the opposite way Lakoff's theory predicted it would. Strict parents were actually more likely
to agree that there are more things that government should be doing. With only four out of six
attitudes significantly predicted by parenting and one attitude directly contradicting his theory, it is
difficult to say that Hypothesis 2c lends much support to Lakoff.
CONCLUSION
It appears that parenting might not be the single dominant political heuristic, as Lakoff
predicted, but it certainly cannot be discounted. Few variables tested in political science have shown
such a significant and consistent effect. The very fact that parenting's impact remains significant after
controlling for party ID and ideology proves that Lakoff was on to something. The parenting index
is off the charts for security and tradition, and even for many issues dealing with equality. However, it
seems that parenting might be a poor predictor about people's views towards government. This is
problematic, because Lakoff's central point was that the way people envision parent-child relations is
the way they envision government-citizen relations. Parenting seems to be very important for
politics-probably far more important than anyone suspected-but it is not always important in the
exact ways Lakoff predicted. Nonetheless, he made a bold and original claim that largely passed the
test of empirical scrutiny.
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